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HE Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq.
("FSIA"), provides the exclusive basis for suing a foreign sover-
eign in United States courts. While the FSIA generally grants im-
munity to foreign sovereigns, it also lays out a number of exceptions
under which U.S. courts may exercise jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have thus
used this statute as a basis to sue foreign governments and their agencies
and instrumentalities in a variety of contexts, ranging from purely com-
mercial disputes to wrongful death claims on behalf of victims of state-
sponsored terrorism. The purpose of this Review is to provide an over-
view of the primary areas of litigation under the FSIA through an analy-
sis of judicial decisions invoking the statute in 2013.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE FSIA IN 2013
Over the years, the number of reported decisions discussing the FSIA
has steadily increased. The continuing globalization of business and in-
creased involvement of sovereigns and their instrumentalities in interna-
tional commerce have resulted in an increase in litigation involving
foreign states. Thus, not surprisingly, FSIA litigation in 2013 often fo-
cused on the statute's "commercial activity" exception, but also dealt with
various other, often novel and creative, arguments raised by the parties.
In these cases, courts addressed the core issues sovereign and private liti-
gants face under the FSIA, including:
" Who is a "foreign state" subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts?
" Which acts are "commercial" and which are "governmental"?
* How close must the nexus be between an act and the United
States?
* What acts violate international law under the "takings" exception?
* When may plaintiffs pursue foreign sovereign assets located in the
United States to satisfy U.S. court judgments?
This Review will focus on the answers to those questions provided by
U.S. courts in 2013. This Review also includes a short introduction to the
FSIA as well as some practical guidance based on recent FSIA decisions.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FSIA
Foreign sovereigns have enjoyed immunity from suit in U.S. courts for
nearly two centuries. As early as 1812 in Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
don,' U.S. courts generally declined to assert jurisdiction over cases in-
volving foreign government defendants, a practice rooted in a sense of
"grace and comity" between the United States and other nations. 2 Judges
instead deferred to the views of the Executive Branch as to whether such
cases should proceed in U.S. courts, exercising jurisdiction only where the
U.S. State Department expressly referred claims for their consideration.
3
In 1952, U.S. courts' jurisdiction over claims against foreign states and
their agents expanded significantly when the U.S. State Department is-
sued the so-called "Tate Letter" announcing its adoption of a new "re-
strictive theory" of foreign sovereign immunity.4 The "Tate Letter"
directed that state sovereigns continue to be granted immunity from suits
involving their sovereign, or "public," acts.5 But, acts taken in a commer-
cial, or "private," capacity no longer would be protected from U.S. court
review. 6 Yet, even with this new guidance, courts continued to seek the
Executive Branch's views on a case-by-case basis to determine whether to
assert jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns-a system that risked incon.sis-
tency and susceptibility to "diplomatic pressures rather than to the rule of
law."
7
In 1976, Congress sought to address this problem by enacting the FSIA,
essentially codifying the "restrictive theory" of immunity and empower-
ing the courts to resolve questions of sovereign immunity without resort
to the Executive Branch.8 Today, the FSIA provides the "sole basis" for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S. courts. 9
The FSIA provides that "foreign states"-including their "political
subdivisions" and "agencies or instrumentalities" I0-"shall be immune
from the jurisdiction" of U.S. courts unless one of the exceptions to im-
munity set forth in the statute applies." The FSIA includes several provi-
sions that define the scope of the exceptions to a foreign state's immunity,
and establishes detailed procedural requirements for bringing claims
against a foreign sovereign defendant.1
2
The primary exceptions to immunity are set forth in Section 1605 and
1. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
2. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
3. See id. (explaining history of the FSIA).
4. Id. at 486-87.
5. Id. at 487.
6. Id.
7. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Chuidian v. Phil. Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990)).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012).
9. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2012).
11. See id. § 1604.
12. See id. §§ 1605, 1608, 1610-1611.
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Section 1605A of the FSIA. 13 These exceptions include, inter alia, certain
claims based on commercial activities, expropriation of property, and tor-
tious or terrorist acts by foreign sovereign entities.14 In most instances,
where a claim falls under one of the FSIA exceptions, the Act provides
that the foreign state shall be subject to jurisdiction "in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual. ' 15 The FSIA also includes
separate provisions establishing immunity (and exceptions to immunity)
from the attachment of foreign sovereign property located in the United
States, in aid of execution on a judgment against a foreign state or its
agencies or instrumentalities. 16 Finally, the FSIA sets forth various
unique procedural rules for pursuing claims against foreign states, includ-
ing, e.g., special rules for service of process, default judgments, and
appeals. 17
III. THE DEFINITION OF A FOREIGN STATE: POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS, ORGANS, AGENCIES AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES
A. WHAT Is A "FOREIGN STATE"?
A threshold issue in any case brought under the FSIA is whether the
defendant constitutes a "foreign state." Under the FSIA, "foreign state"
is defined to include not only the state itself (i.e., the state writ-large or its
political subdivisions), but also its agencies and instrumentalities.' 8
To qualify as an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state, an entity
must be (1) a "separate legal person," that is (2) "neither a citizen of a
State of the United States . . . nor created under the laws of any third
country," and (3) either "an organ of a foreign state or political subdivi-
sion thereof" or an entity "a majority of whose shares or other ownership
interest is owned by foreign state or a political subdivision thereof."' 9 In
2013, some U.S. courts had occasion to expound on specific aspects of this
definition. For example, the Eastern District of New York in Chowdhury
v. Saudi Arabian Airlines, the district court noted that a foreign entity
13. Id. §§ 1605, 1605A.
14. Id.
15. Id. § 1606; but see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (providing federal statutory cause of action
for terrorism-related acts).
16. See id. §§ 1610-1611. For example, property belonging to a foreign central bank or
monetary authority and held for its own account is immune from suit absent a
waiver. Id. § 1611(b)(1). Likewise, military property held by a military authority
and used or intended to be used in connection with military activity is immune
from attachment. Id. § 1611(b)(2).
17. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(g), 1608.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
19. Id. § 1603(b). The phrase "not created under the laws of any third country" re-
flects the requirement that the entity must have been created under the laws of the
country of which it purports to be an "agency or instrumentality." See Aluminum
Distribs., Inc. v. Gulf Aluminum Rolling Mill Co., No. 87 C 6477, 1989 WL 64174,
*2 (N.D. I11. June 8, 1989) ("GARMCO is created under the laws of Bahrain, one
of the owner nations. Hence, it is not created under the laws of a third nation, and
it is a foreign state under § 1603.").
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would not be considered a citizen of a United States state simply by vir-
tue of its authorization to perform business in that state.2 0
The FSIA does not provide a specific test for determining whether an
entity is an "organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof"--the
third prong of the definition of "agency or instrumentality."' 21 In practice,
courts continue to use a set of factors to make this determination. For
example, in Capital Trans International, LLC v. International Petroleum
Investment Co.,2 2 the district court considered a claim against three enti-
ties, one of which was a "public joint stock company with its principal
place of business in Abu Dhabi. ' ' 23 The court applied a series of factors
adopted by the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits to determine whether
the publicly traded company was an "organ" of Abu Dhabi:
(1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a national purpose;
(2) whether the foreign state actively supervises the entity;
(3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employees
and pays their salaries;
(4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in the [for-
eign] country; and
(5) how the entity is treated under foreign state law.24
None of these factors is, by itself, dispositive; nor must all be satisfied.2 5
In Capital Trans Int'l, LLC, because none of these factors suggested that
the public joint stock company at issue was an "organ" of the Abu Dhabi
state, the court dismissed the case as to that defendant. 26
B. THE "CORE FUNCTIONS TEST": "GOVERNMENTAL" VERSUS
"COMMERCIAL" ACTIVITIES
Although the FSIA recognizes the immunity of an "agency or instru-
mentality" of a foreign sovereign, such entities are subject to different
statutory rules than the sovereign or its political subdivisions. In particu-
lar, rules relating to service of process, venue, the availability of punitive
damages, and attachment of assets can differ depending on whether the
defendant is deemed an agency of the state or the state itself.27 To make
20. No. 13-CV-2537 (RJD), 2013 WL 2395986, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2013) (find-
ing that Saudi Arabian Airlines was not a citizen of New York by virtue of its
authorization to perform business in New York).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a).
22. No. 8:10-CV-529-T-30TGW, 2013 WL 557236, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2013) (in-
ternal citations omitted).
23. Id. The other two entities included a company "wholly-owned by and organized as
an instrumentality of the Abu Dhabi government" and a "private limited liability
company organized under the laws of Abu Dhabi" and in whose formation "[t]he
government of Abu Dhabi had no role[.]" Id.
24. Id. at *6 (citing Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2004)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at *8-10.
27. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608(a)-(b) (service of process); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(f)(3)-(4)
(permitting venue in suits against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
"in any judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do
business or is doing business"); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a)-(b) (attachment of assets).
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this distinction, courts apply the so-called "core functions test." Under
this test, if the entity's predominant activities, or its "core functions," are
"governmental" in nature, courts will treat the entity as if it were the state
itself and apply rules and standards that are more protective of the sover-
eign.2 8 On the other hand, if the entity's "core functions" are predomi-
nantly "commercial" in character, courts will apply the less protective
rules and standards reserved for agencies and instrumentalities of the
state.2 9 For example, in Buonocore v. Great Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, the district court determined that it should treat the
Syrian Air Force Intelligence agency as a foreign state because its core
functions were "governmental" and not "commercial. '30 Similarly, the
district court in Richardson v. Attorney General of the British Virgins Is-
lands concluded that "[c]ertainly, the Attorney General's role as the prin-
cipal legal advisor to the BVI Government is a governmental, as opposed
to a commercial[,] function. '3 1
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL GRANT OF IMMUNITY
Once a court concludes that an entity is a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state entitled to sovereign immunity under
the FSIA, it must then decide if one of the exceptions set forth in the
FSIA applies. This section examines how the courts addressed those ex-
ceptions in 2013.
A. WAIVER-§ 1605(A)(1)
The FSIA provides in Section 1605(a)(1):
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case.., in which the foreign
state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, not-
withstanding any withdrawal of the waiver that the foreign state may
purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the
waiver .... 32
In 2013, the courts addressed a broad range of issues under the waiver
exception, including: (1) waiver by treaty, (2) waiver by contract, (3)
waiver by agreeing to governing law, and (4) waiver by failing to raise the
defense in a responsive pleading.
1. Waiver by Treaty
The Second Circuit, in Blue Ridge Investments, L.L.C. v. Republic of
28. Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
29. Id.
30. No. CIV.A. 06-727 JMF, 2013 WL 351546, at *21 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2013) amended
sub nom. Estate of Buonocore v. Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
No. CIV.A. 06-727 JMF, 2013 WL 653921 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2013)
31. CV 2008-144, 2013 WL 4494975, at *2 (D.V.l. Aug. 20, 2013).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
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Argentina,3 3 held that by signing the ICSID Convention 34-an interna-
tional treaty protecting foreign direct investment-Argentina had agreed
to an implied waiver of its sovereign immunity. 35 The court explained:
Although this exception "must be construed narrowly," we agree
with the District Court that ... Argentina waived its sovereign im-
munity by becoming a party to the ICSID Convention.
As the District Court noted, "[p]ursuant to Article 54 of the Conven-
tion, [e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pur-
suant to th[e] Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a
final judgment of a court in that State." In light of the enforcement
mechanism provided by the ICSID Convention, we agree with the
District Court that Argentina "must have contemplated enforcement
actions in other [Contracting] [S]tates," including the United
States.3
6
2. Waiver by Contract
In Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd. v. Republic of Nauru,37 the dis-
trict court rejected the plaintiff's argument that Nauru had explicitly
waived its sovereign immunity from process in U.S. courts when it signed
a repayment guarantee for certain bonds. 38 In that guarantee, Nauru ex-
pressly waived sovereign immunity as to the courts of Japan and Nauru.
39
The plaintiff argued that that waiver was "not limited to actions brought
in Japan or Nauru, but goes to any legal action relating to the Guaran-
tee."' 40 The court disagreed, stating:
Generally, with regard to express waivers under this provision, "[a]
foreign sovereign will not be found to have waived its immunity un-
less it has clearly and unambiguously done so. [E]xplicit waivers of
sovereign immunity are narrowly construed in favor of the sovereign
and are not enlarged beyond what the language requires."
The limited nature of the waivers of sovereign immunity in this case
and the obligation to narrowly construe explicit waivers in favor of
the sovereign doom the plaintiff's argument under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(1). 4 1
33. 735 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013).
34. United Nations Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
35. Blue Ridge, 735 F.3d at 83-84.
36. Id. at 84 (internal citations omitted). Since the Second Circuit's decision, Argen-
tina has announced its intention to withdraw from ICSID. Argentina in the Process
of Quitting from World Bank Investment Disputes Centre, MERcoPREss, S. AnL.
Ni~ws AG1ENCY (Jan 31, 2013), available at http://en.mercopress.com/2013/01/31/ar
gentina-in-the-process-of-quitting-from-world-bank-investment-disputes-centre.
37. 915 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D.D.C. 2013).
38. Id. at 126-28.
39. Id. at 126.
40. Id. at 127 (emphasis in original).
41. Id. at 126-28 (internal citations omitted).
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Because the waiver language in the guarantee was limited to the courts of
Japan and Nauru, the court found that Nauru had not waived its immu-
nity for actions brought in U.S. courts.42
In Commissions Import Export S.A. v. Republic of Congo,43 a dispute
arose over the repayment of debts owed under contracts between the
plaintiff and Congo.44 In a series of commitment letters, Congo "irrevo-
cably and on a final basis waive[d] the right to invoke any immunity from
legal proceedings. ' 45 The court held that "[t]his language expressly
waives defendants' sovereign immunity pursuant to section 1605(a)(1)." '46
Based on this clear language and the fact that the defendants "concede[d]
that they waived their sovereign immunity," the court found that it had
subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.47
3. Waiver by Agreeing to Governing Law
In Ewald v. Royal Norwegian Embassy,48 the plaintiff sued her em-
ployer, the Norwegian Embassy in Minneapolis, alleging employment dis-
crimination.49  U.S. and Minnesota law governs the plaintiff's
employment agreement. 50 Following a discovery dispute in which the
plaintiff demanded certain information and documents regarding the
Norwegian Foreign Service ("NFS"), 51 the district court upheld the mag-
istrate judge's denial of the plaintiff's motion to compel.52 The court
found that, despite the Embassy's agreement that the employment rela-
tionship would be governed by domestic law, the discovery sought "ex-
ceed[ed] the scope of the Embassy's waiver of inviolability under
international law."'53
The court stated that "[o]ne exception to jurisdictional immunity oc-
curs when a foreign state waives its immunity, either explicitly or by im-
plication. Implied waiver occurs when 'a foreign state has agreed that a
contract is governed by the law of a particular country."' 54 But, pointing
to the "treaty exception" in Section 1604, the court explained:
[A] foreign state's waiver of immunity to the jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts under the FSIA is not synonymous with a waiver of the pro-
tections provided by the treaties that pre-date the FSIA and to which
the United States is a party .... [O]ne such treaty is the Vienna
42. Id. at 128.
43. 916 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2013), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 757 F.3d
321 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
44. Id. at 49.
45. Id. at 51.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. No. 11-CV-2116 (SRN/SER), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164828 (D. Minn. Nov. 20,
2013).
49. Id. at *1-3.
50. Id. at *15.
51. Id. at *8-9.
52. Id. at *18.
53. Id. at *10.
54. Ewald, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164828, at *11.
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Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which was opened for signa-
ture in 1961 and was enforceable with respect to the United States in
1972.55
The court held that the Embassy's agreement that the "employment
relationship shall be governed by the laws of the country in which the
Employee is employed," did not waive the Embassy's right to object to
discovery based on Article 24 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations and Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. 56
4. Waiver by Failure to Raise Immunity
In Exim Brickell LLC v. PDVSA Services Inc. 57 the Eleventh Circuit
found that a sovereign defendant had waived immunity because it had
failed to raise the argument in the court below.58 In this contract dispute,
the plaintiff (Exim) had imported large quantities of powdered milk from
China and delivered shipments to defendant Bariven S.A., a Venezuelan
state-owned purchasing company. 59 After a melamine contamination
scare for Chinese milk products and the subsequent discovery of such
contamination in the goods imported by the plaintiff, the parties disputed
responsibility for inspection and storage costs under the installment con-
tract and filed cross-claims. 60
Neither party contested the district court's jurisdiction to hear the
case.61 In a unique twist, when the district court awarded partial damages
to Bariven, Exim-the party who brought the case in the first instance-
appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit, raising itself the question
whether Bariven's immunity foreclosed jurisdiction over Exim's own
claim. Exim noted that the Eleventh Circuit, in a related case (Absolute
Trading Corp. v. Bariven), had entertained a question as to the district
court's jurisdiction over Bariven, as a sovereign "agency," 62 though it ulti-
mately held that Bariven's contract with a seller of powdered milk from
China fell under the commercial activity exception to immunity under the
FSIA.63 The Eleventh Circuit in Exim noted that the commercial activity
exception likewise would have applied there.64 But it did not need to
reach the issue because "Bariven, the only party possibly in a position to
assert sovereign immunity, did not do so," and thereby waived
immunity.65
55. Id.
56. Id. at *11-15.
57. 516 F. App'x 742 (1lth Cir. 2013).
58. Id. at 748-49.
59. Id. at 745.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 748.
62. Brief of Appellant-Cross Appellee at 1, Exim Brickell, LLC v. Bariven, S.A., 516
F. App'x 742 (11th Cir. 2013).
63. Absolute Trading Corp. v. Bariven, S.A., 503 F. App'x 694, 697 (11th Cir. 2013).
64. Id.
65. Exim Brickell, LLC, 516 F. App'x at 749.
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In Richardson v. Attorney General of the British Virgin Islands,66 the
court reached the opposite conclusion where the defendant's failure to
raise immunity was based on its failure to appear at all. In that case, the
plaintiffs sued for physical injuries they allegedly sustained while on a
boat owned by the British Virgin Islands ("BVI") and operated by a BVI
customs agent.67 After the defendants failed to appear, the plaintiffs
moved for a default judgment. The court analyzed whether, inter alia, the
waiver exception in Section 1605(a)(1) applied. 68 The court stated that a
sovereign's claim of immunity is waived "only when the sovereign/state
fails to assert immunity in a responsive pleading" and not simply because
a sovereign entity fails to appear before a court.69 The court stated:
"Thus, a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied from a for-
eign state's failure to appear. Such a waiver would be inconsistent
with Section 1608(e) of the FSIA, which requires the court to satisfy
itself that jurisdiction exists prior to entering a default judgment.
'Even if the foreign state does not enter an appearance to assert an
immunity defense, a district court still must determine that immunity
is unavailable under the Act." 70
Because BVI had not done anything to "explicitly or impliedly waive[
its immunity," the court held that the waiver exception did not apply.7 1
5. Alleged Assistance with Asylum Request-Not Waiver
In Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya,72 the plaintiff sued Kenya and re-
lated sovereign defendants, alleging that the defendants (i) improperly
failed to pay him a reward for reporting certain tax misconduct by his
former employer and (ii) improperly disclosed the plaintiff's identity as
an informant, forcing him to seek asylum in the United States.73 Plaintiff
asserted "that defendants implicitly waived their immunity by helping
him seek asylum in the United States," stating "[s]ince the 'processing' of
Plaintiff for admission into the United States was an adjudicatory process
under the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980, Defendants implicitly agreed for
their obligation to protect Plaintiff to be governed by U.S. law."'74
The court rejected this argument on two grounds.75 First, the plaintiff
acknowledged in his own pleadings that the defendants had not
"processed" his asylum application under any "adjudicatory process"
under U.S. law.76 Second, the alleged acts "were not related to any 'con-
66. 2013 WL 4494975 at *1-2.
67. Id. at *1.
68. Id. at *3.
69. Id. at *4.
70. Id. (internal citation omitted).
71. Id.
72. 930 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2013), affid, 764 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014), petition for
cert. filed, No. 14-1206 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2015).
73. Id. at 19-20.
74. Id. at 24.
75. Id. at 24-25.
76. Id. at 24.
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duct of litigation,' let alone this one."' 77 The court reasoned that "Con-
gress primarily expected courts to hold a foreign state to an implied
waiver of sovereign immunity by the state's actions in relation to the con-
duct of litigation."' 78 Because "[tihis matter is not about [plaintiff's] asy-
lum in the United States; his relocation occurred more than five years
before [the plaintiff] filed this suit, and [the plaintiff] has not pointed to
any action taken by defendants 'in relation to the conduct of litigation'
[which would] indicate their amenability to suit in the United States," the
court concluded that the defendants had not implicitly waived their
immunity.79
B. COMMERCIAL AcviITY-§ 1605(A)(2)
As foreign sovereigns continue to participate actively in the global
marketplace, the "commercial activity" exception remains one of the
most frequently litigated provisions of the FSIA.80 This exception to im-
munity, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), provides that a foreign state
shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in a case where
the action is based:
[(1)] upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state; or [(2)] upon an act performed in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where; or [(3)] upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where and that act causes a direct effect in the United States .... 81
In other words, foreign states lose their immunity from suit in the United
States when their actions are commercial and have a nexus to the United
States (i.e., are carried out, or cause a direct effect, in the United
States).82
1. What Acts Are Considered "Commercial"?
Determining at what point a foreign state's acts cross the line from
governmental to commercial is fundamental to the "commercial activity"
analysis, because the courts define a sovereign's acts by their nature, not
77. Id. (citing Abur v. Republic of Sudan, 437 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178 (D.D.C. 2006)).
78. Id. (quoting Smith ex rel Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101
F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 1996)).
79. Id. at 24-25.
80. See e.g., Lasheen v. Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 485 F. App'x 203 (9th
Cir. 2012); Best Med. Belg., Inc. v. Kingdom of Belg., 913 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.
Va. 2012); S.K. Innovation, Inc. v. Finpol, 854 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C 2012);
Lantheus Med. Imaging, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 841 F. Supp. 2d 769 (S.D.N.Y
2012). See also Adam S. Chilton & Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign Sovereign
Immunity and Comparative Institutional Competence, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 456
(2015) ("[tjhe commercial activity exception is the FSIA's most frequently litigated
exception to immunity.").
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
82. For a discussion of immunity from attachment or enforcement of judgments based
on commercial activity, see Part IV.B, infra.
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their purpose. 83 Although these are fact-intensive inquiries, they often
focus on the core principle that commercial acts are acts that any private
entity could undertake, whereas governmental acts are those made possi-
ble through power peculiar to a sovereign.84 Federal court decisions in
2013 addressing this issue are described below.
Contracting for Asset Recovery Services-Commercial. In Universal
Trading & Investment Co. v. Bureau for Representing Ukrainian Interests
in International & Foreign Courts, a contractor ("UTICo") brought suit
against the Ukrainian government for breach of contract.85 UTICo had
agreed to perform certain asset recovery services for the Ukrainian gov-
ernment, which included locating and freezing criminal assets abroad. 86
In determining whether subject matter jurisdiction existed under the
FSIA, the court determined that UTICo's contract with Ukraine was "in-
distinguishable from ordinary asset recovery services. '87 The court noted
that, "[e]ven if the final goal or purpose of the information and assistance
was uniquely governmental . . . , [t]he nature of UTICo's contracted-for
services" was commercial, as any private party can enter into a similar
contract.88 Moreover, the contract did not call for UTICo to perform any
governmental functions, but rather to facilitate Ukraine's ability to per-
form its governmental functions itself-prosecution of the criminals
whose assets UTICo was seeking.89
Bailment Agreements to Return Plunders of War-Commercial. In de
Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, descendants of a Jewish family sued Hun-
gary for the country's failure to return a family art collection seized dur-
ing World War 11.90 The plaintiffs argued that, following the War, the
Hungarian government entered into bailment agreements with the family
by offering to retain their artwork for safekeeping, but to return the col-
lection at the family's request.91 When such a request was not complied
with, the plaintiffs filed suit, arguing that U.S. courts had jurisdiction
under the FSIA's commercial activity exception. 92
The D.C. Circuit held that "Hungary's alleged breach of bailment
agreements easily satisfies [the "commercial activity"] standard. '93 First,
the repudiation of a contract was "precisely the type of activity in which a
private player within the market engages." 94 And second, the contract
established Hungary's commercial relations with respect to artwork,
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
84. See e.g., Republic of Arg.v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).
85. 727 F.3d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 2013).
86. Id. at 12-13.
87. Id. at 20.
88. Id. at 19-20.
89. Id. at 20.
90. 714 F.3d 591, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
91. Id. at 596.
92. Id. at 598.
93. Id. at 599.
94. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349,
360 (1993)).
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about which there was nothing "sovereign. '95 That Hungary initially ac-
quired the Jewish family's artwork by confiscating it during the Holocaust
was irrelevant to the commercial analysis because this arguably sovereign
act did not form the basis of the plaintiffs' claims. 96 Rather, that basis
was Hungary's commercial act of creating and then repudiating its post-
War bailment agreements.
97
Contracting for Intelligence Services-Not Commercial. In Eringer v.
Principality of Monaco, plaintiff sued Monaco for failure to pay him for
services rendered. 98 Monaco claimed sovereign immunity, and the Ninth
Circuit agreed. Monaco had employed Eringer as its Director of Intelli-
gence Services.9 9 The duties that Eringer performed under his contract
with Monaco included "liasing with other intelligence agencies, investi-
gating potential government appointments, investigating suspicions of
corruption . . . and protecting [the Royal family] from improper foreign
influence." 1' The Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court that Er-
inger's employment was thus "not the type of employment private parties
can undertake." 10 1 Because the contract underlying plaintiff's complaint
was not commercial, Monaco was entitled to immunity.
2. What Acts Create a Nexus with the United States?
Once a court has determined that a foreign sovereign's act is "commer-
cial" under the FSIA, it must then decide whether that act has a sufficient
nexus with the United States to satisfy the commercial activity excep-
tion.10 2 That nexus can exist in one of three circumstances: (1) the for-
eign sovereign "carried on" the commercial act in the United States; (2)
the challenged act took place in the United States in connection with
commercial activity abroad; or (3) the foreign sovereign acted outside the
United States in connection with its commercial activity, but caused a
"direct effect" in the United States.
10 3
a. Acts in the United States by Foreign States
The first clause of the commercial activity exception permits jurisdic-
tion over commercial acts "carried on in the United States" by foreign
states.1 4 Federal courts addressed this issue multiple times in 2013, often
concluding that the alleged acts established a sufficient nexus with the
United States to satisfy the exception.
95. Id. (quoting Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 314 (D.D.C.
2005)).
96. Id. at 600.
97. Id.
98. 533 F. App'x 703, 704 (9th Cir. 2013).
99. Id. at 705.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See e.g., Universal Trading, 727 F.3d at 25-26.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
104. Id.
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Partial Ownership of the Group Contracting with U.S. Company-Suf-
ficient. In Sachs v. Republic of Austria, plaintiff (Sachs) sued an Aus-
trian-owned national railway after suffering injuries while attempting to
board a moving train in Austria. 10 5 Sachs argued that her claim was
"based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States" be-
cause she purchased the railway ticket through a Massachusetts-based
travel agent. 10 6 In an en banc reversal of its prior decision, the Ninth
Circuit agreed with Sachs. 10 7 Although the national railway was not di-
rectly related to the local travel agent, the travel agent was authorized as
the railway's subagent to sell tickets in the United States that the railway
would honor in Austria.' 0 8 As the Court held: "Where a ticket for travel
on a foreign common carrier is bought and paid for in the United States,
* . . [FSIA's] substantial contact requirement is satisfied." 109
Contracting with U.S. Law Firm for Legal Services-Sufficient. In
Lanny J. Davis & Associates LLC v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea, the
plaintiff sued for failure to pay for legal services rendered, namely advice
and assistance in instituting a "comprehensive program of political, legal,
and economic reform." 11 0 The Washington D.C.-based law firm argued
that, because it had substantially performed its contract from within the
United States, Equitorial Guinea was not immune from suit under the
FSIA."' The court concluded that this first prong of the FSIA's commer-
cial activity exception was "easily met."'"1 2 In performance of its contract,
the law firm's lead attorney met with the defendants' ambassador and
government officials, U.S. government officials, U.S. business leaders,
and NGOs all in Washington, D.C.11 3 Indeed, plaintiff performed the
"majority" of its work from the United States.1 1 4
Execution of Unilateral Contract in United States-Sufficient. In Uni-
versal Trading & Investment Co., discussed supra, the First Circuit found
that the sovereign's activity not only was commercial, but was also "car-
ried on the United States."" 5 The court noted that UTICo and Ukraine
had negotiated the entirety of their asset recovery contract within the
United States, that UTICo was organized under the laws of the United
States and maintained its principal place of business in Massachusetts,
and finally that "more than 90%" of UTICo's work under the contract
was performed in Massachusetts." 6 Moreover, and key to the court's de-
cision, was that the parties' agreement stemmed from an offer made by
105. 737 F.3d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub. nom. OBB Personenverkehr
AG v. Sachs, 135 S. Ct. 1172 (2015).
106. Id. at 590.
107. Id. at 603.
108. Id. at 593.
109. Id. at 599.
110. 962 F. Supp. 2d 152, 156 (D.D.C. 2013).
111. Id. at 158.
112. Id. at 159.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Universal Trading, 727 F.3d at 25-26.
116. Id.
2015] FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: 2013 255
Ukraine to UTICo in the United States.11 7 It was this offer that estab-
lished a nexus or link between the two parties and thus allowed the for-
eign sovereign to "engage[] in commerce and officially enter[] the
marketplace in the United States." 118
b. Acts in the United States in Connection with Commercial
Activity Abroad
The second clause of the commercial activity exception under Section
1605(a)(2) provides for jurisdiction where the challenged acts take place
in the United States but relate to a sovereign's commercial activity
abroad.1 19 The U.S.-based acts must also be "in connection with" the
commercial activity of the foreign state.' 20 As is the case with all of the
commercial activity exceptions, those acts must also form the basis of the
suit itself.
The federal courts found few opportunities in 2013 to address substan-
tively the second clause of the commercial activity exception. One court
that did address the issue focused primarily on the question of whether
the alleged U.S. acts were actually relevant to the suit at hand.12 ' As
explained supra, in Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, the plaintiff sued the
African country for violating its "Information Reward Scheme" in which
plaintiff had participated. 122 Specifically, the plaintiff had assisted the
Kenyan government by relaying information related to potential tax eva-
sion occurring at a Kenyan bank at which he had worked.1 2 3 In return,
Kenya was to provide plaintiff with a monetary award, while keeping his
cooperation strictly confidential. 124 According to the plaintiff, Kenya did
neither, prompting him to flee to the United States. 25
In holding that the complaint did not satisfy the commercial activity
exception, the district court focused on the relationship between the
plaintiff's cause of action and the alleged acts that occurred in the United
States in connection with Kenya's commercial activity abroad. 26 The
court concluded that "[n]one of the U.S.-based acts that [plaintiff] lists to
support his ... argument form the basis of this action.' 2 7 For example,
although the defendants had helped the plaintiff obtain asylum in the
United States, this was irrelevant to his breach of contract claim; as were
the Kenyan bank's diversion of funds to the United States and the plain-
tiff's attempts to negotiate his award from the United States.1 28 As
117. Id. at 25.
118. Id. at 24-25.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
120. Id.
121. Odhiambo, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
122. Id. at 20.
123. Id. at 20-21.
124. Id. at 20.
125. Id. at 21.
126. Id. at 29-30.
127. Odhiambo, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 30.
128. Id.
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"none of these acts constitute[d] facts without which the plaintiff w[ould]
lose his case," the second clause of the commercial activity exception did
not apply. 129
c. Acts outside the United States that Cause a "Direct Effect" in
the United States
The third clause of the commercial activity exception permits jurisdic-
tion over acts that occur outside the United States, but which cause a
"direct effect" in the United States. 130 This third category was a frequent
subject of litigation in 2013, as courts grappled with what constituted a
"direct" and an "indirect" effect. 131
Financial Loss of U.S. Plaintiff-No Direct Effect. In Chey v. Orbitz
Worldwide, Inc., the plaintiff sued Air China for failing to notify him at
the time of his ticket purchase that his destination country of Brazil re-
quires U.S. visitors to have visas.' 32 In response, Air China argued that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because, as a corporate entity
whose majority of shares were owned by the Chinese government, it was
immune under the FSIA.133 The district court agreed, holding that none
of the FSIA's exceptions applied.134 The flight at issue was from Spain to
Brazil and the plaintiff purchased the ticket in Paris.' 35 Indeed, the only
connection to the United States was the location of the plaintiff's "legally
[in]significant" loss. 136 This, the court held, was insufficient. "A mere
financial loss suffered by a plaintiff in the United States as a result of the
action abroad of a foreign state does not constitute a 'direct effect' and
cannot by itself create subject matter jurisdiction under Section
1605(a)(2)."'1 37
Overseas Copying of U.S. Product-No Direct Effect. The case of Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran continues to present
new insights into the FSIA. 138 In that case, a U.S. helicopter manufac-
turer brought suit against Iran for the country's alleged manufacturing
and marketing of a similar but substandard version of one of Bell's heli-
copter models. 139 In 2011, the court entered a default judgment against
Iran, finding a waiver of sovereign immunity because its actions had a
"direct effect" in the United States.' 40 In 2012, the court considered
129. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
131. See Chey v. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1219-1234 (D. Haw.
2013).
132. Id. at 1224.
133. Id. at 1224, 1228.
134. Id. at 1128.
135. Id. at 1229.
136. Id.
137. Chey, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (quoting Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1527
(9th Cir. 1989)).
138. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Bell Helicopter I), 764 F.
Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2011).
139. Id. at 122.
140. Id. at 126.
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Iran's motion to vacate the 2011 default judgment and again considered
whether the country's manufacturing of low quality but visibly similar
helicopters had caused a "direct effect" in the United States. 1 4 1 After
considering testimony regarding the "potential confusion" between the
two types of helicopters and the respective markets in which the two heli-
copters were sold, the court concluded that the Iranian manufacturing
and marketing had not caused a direct effect in the United States. 142 Bell
appealed.
The D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding that the evidence that Bell presented
was "too remote and attenuated to satisfy the 'direct effect' require-
ment. 1 43 Bell had not presented any evidence that its current or poten-
tial customers were likely to encounter the Iranian helicopters, nor that
any consumers had considered purchasing the Iranian model over its
own.144 Bell also failed to show that the presence of the similar-looking,
but technically inferior, Iranian helicopters in the broader market had
damaged its reputation. 145 Finally, the court rejected Bell's argument
that Iran's actions had caused a direct effect in the United States because,
under U.S. intellectual property law, the effect of an infringement occurs
where the possessor of the intellectual property resides.146 The court
leaned on a Second Circuit opinion that stated that "[tihe fact that an
American individual or firm suffers some financial loss from a foreign
tort cannot, standing alone, suffice to trigger the [direct effect]
exception."'1 47
Loss of Third Party Revenue in United States-Direct Effect. In Hel-
merich & Payne International Drilling Co. v. Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela, the Venezuelan government breached its contracts with a U.S.-
based oil drilling company and its Venezuelan subsidiary by refusing to
pay for services rendered. 148 When the plaintiff (H&P) subsequently re-
fused to renegotiate renewal of the breached contracts, Venezuela nation-
alized its property, including drilling rigs, real property, vehicles, and
equipment.149 H&P sued Venezuela for takings under international law
and breach of contract, arguing that the breach of the underlying con-
tracts caused a "direct effect" in the United States. 1 50 The court agreed.
Under the contracts, H&P was to procure specific equipment from spe-
141. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Bell Helicopter II), 892 F.
Supp. 2d 219, 225-34 (D.D.C. 2012).
142. Id. at 232-33.
143. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 734 F.3d 1175,1186 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S at 618).
144. Id. at 1185.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1186.
147. Id. at 1184 (quoting Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d
33, 34 (2d Cir. 1993)).
148. 971 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2013), affd in part, rev'd in part, 784 F.3d 804 (D.C.
Cir. 2015).
149. Id. at 55.
150. Id. at 56.
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cific manufacturers in the United States. 5 1 The breach of those contracts
resulted in the loss of those manufacturers' revenues from the required
purchases. 52 The court clarified that the "direct effects" under the FSIA
need not necessarily harm the plaintiff) 53 Any direct effect in the United
States was sufficient.154
Failure to Pay U.S. Law Firm for Legal Services-Direct Effect. In
Lanny J. Davis & Associates, discussed supra, the court asserted jurisdic-
tion over a U.S. law firm's suit against Equatorial Guinea for failure to
pay for legal services rendered.1 5 5 After finding that plaintiff's perform-
ance of the majority of its contract in the United States constituted a
commercial activity that was "carried on in the United States,"' 56 the
court further noted that "subject matter jurisdiction would [also] exist be-
cause this action arises from commercial activity ... causing a 'direct
effect' here.'' 57 Namely, even if all relevant acts had occurred outside
the United States, the African country had failed to make contractually
required deposits in a U.S. bank.15 8 This lack of payment was a sufficient
"direct effect," regardless of how "important, critical, or integral" the
parties considered the place of payment.' 59
Failure to Return Plunders of War to U.S. Owners-Direct Effect. As
discussed supra, de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary involved a Jewish fam-
ily's suit against Hungary for violation of its bailment contract with the
family to maintain the family's artwork in national museums and to re-
turn the artwork upon the family's request.' 60 The plaintiffs argued that
the commercial activity exception applied because Hungary's failure to
return the artwork had a "direct effect" in the United States.' 6' Specifi-
cally, the bailment contract required specific performance of the art-
work's return, and Hungary was aware that the family now resided in the
United States. 162 Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plain-
tiffs, the D.C. Circuit found these facts sufficient to establish a "direct
151. Id. at 66.
152. Id. at 68.
153. Id.
154. In 2015, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's direct effects holding because
there had been no breach of H&P's third-party contracts with U.S. manufacturers,
as H&P had already performed its obligations under those contracts. 784 F.3d at
817. As there were no breaches of those contracts, there were no losses resulting
from Venezuela's breach of its contract with H&P, and therefore no direct effect in
the United States. Id. The D.C. Circuit also rejected the argument that H&P's
inability to renew the third-party contracts was a direct effect of Venezuela's
breach, since H&P did not allege that it would have renewed the third-party con-
tracts if Venezuela had not breached its agreement with H&P, but rather that it
would have renewed the third-party contracts if Venezuela chose to renew its con-
tract with H&P. Id.
155. Davis & Assoc. LLC, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 159-60.
156. Id. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
157. Davis & Assoc. LLC, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 153.
160. de Csepel, 714 F.3d at 596.
161. Id. at 598.
162. Id. at 601.
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effect" in the United States-the failure to return property to U.S. re-
sidents-and allowed the suit to proceed under the commercial activity
exception.163
Failure to Pay U.S. Asylum Seeker Award for Assisting Foreign Gov-
ernment-No Direct Effect. In Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, Kenya
argued that U.S. courts did not have jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim for
breach of the country's "Information Reward Scheme," and the court
agreed. 164 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that his relocation
to the United States constituted a "direct effect" under the FSIA, finding
that the relocation was not an "immediate consequence" of Kenya's
breach of contract. 165 Indeed, before the plaintiff fled Kenya, the
Kenyan government actually had protected him from threats and faulty
warrants drawn up by corrupt officials. 166 Moreover, in trying to protect
himself from corrupt officials, the plaintiff himself had revealed his iden-
tity to a local newspaper, which led to a second string of threats that
forced him ultimately to flee the country.' 67 Accordingly, there was no
direct connection between Kenya's failure to ensure the plaintiff's safety
and his eventual decision to flee to the United States.
168
C. TAKINGS-§ 1605(A)(3)
The FSIA provides the following in Section 1605(a)(3)
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which rights in
property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that
property or any property exchanged for such property is present in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on
163. Id. The court also addressed the "treaty exception" of 28 U.S.C. § 1604, which
provides that, "[s]ubject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of enactment of [the FSIA]" in 1976, foreign sover-
eigns are generally immune from suit in the United States. Id. Addressing the
general rule that the treaty exception applies 'only if there is an express conflict
between the treaty and the FSIA exception,"' Hungary argued that such an "ex-
press conflict" was created by two treaties to which the United States. is a signa-
tory, namely the 1947 Peace Treaty between Hungary and the Allies ("Peace
Treaty") and the 1973 U.S.-Hungarian Claims Settlement Agreement ("1973
Agreement"). Id. (quoting Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 266 F. App'x 1, 2 (D.C.
Cir. 2008). Hungary argued that these treaties "establish[ed] an exclusive treaty-
based mechanism for resolving all claims seeking restitution of property discrimi-
natorily expropriated during World War I1 from individuals subject to Hungarian
jurisdiction" and "bar[red] litigation against it for claims based on expropriation of
property during World War II." Id. at 602. The court disagreed, pointing out that
the treaties govern only takings during World War II, and therefore did not impact
Hungary's amenability to suit under the FSIA with respect to the alleged post-war
breach of the bailment agreement. Id. at 603.
164. Odhiambo, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 27-32. See also Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya,
947 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that amended complaint still failed FSIA
exception requirements).
165. Odhiambo, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 31-32.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 32.
168. Id.
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in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any
property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or in-
strumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United
States.
In 2013, federal courts addressed several cases in which plaintiffs alleged
that the sovereign defendant should be subject to jurisdiction based on
the FSIA's "takings" (or "expropriation") exception. It is settled that a
sovereign's taking of the property of its own citizens, no matter how egre-
gious, does not constitute a "violation of international law" under Section
1605(a)(3). 169 Thus, in each of the cases described below, the focus was
the citizenship of the plaintiffs and/or their predecessors for purposes of
analyzing whether the takings at issue violated international law.
1. "Re-Taking" by Refusal to Compensate?
In Santivanez v. Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia,170 the plaintiffs (U.S.
citizens) were the heirs of Francisco Loza, a Bolivian national. 171 They
alleged that Bolivia had expropriated certain plots of land from Loza in
order to build an airport, and that, in 1993, after Loza's death, Bolivia
acknowledged that the family was entitled to full and just compensation
for the land, but that neither Loza nor his heirs had received such com-
pensation.' 72 While the original expropriation was made by Bolivia of
one of its own citizens, plaintiffs argued that Bolivia's subsequent refusal
to compensate plaintiffs was a "re-taking" of property from U.S. citi-
zens.173 The court disagreed:
This case is different. According to Lozas' complaint, the Bolivian
government-when it expropriated Francisco Loza's
land-acknowledged that he (a Bolivian) was entitled to full and just
compensation, consistent with Bolivian law. The Bolivian govern-
ment later issued official resolutions confirming its original posi-
tion.., the Bolivian government has at no time taken official action
to return ownership of the pertinent property to the Loza family or
even officially to declare the Loza family unentitled to just compen-
sation. Although the Lozas have been unsuccessful at enforcing gov-
ernment resolutions for compensation, they have not shown that the
Bolivian government's continued failure to pay just compensation for
the taking of land from Francisco constituted a second taking: a taking
from citizens not of Bolivia and, thus, arguably in violation of inter-
national law. 174
169. See, e.g., Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1976).
170. 512 F. App'x 887 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 158 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2013) (No.
12-1434).
171. Id. at 888.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 889.
174. Id. (emphasis added).
2015] FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: 2013 261
2. Nationality of Corporations
In Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 17 5 discussed supra, a
U.S.-based oil drilling company and its Venezuelan subsidiary alleged
that Venezuela had expropriated drilling rigs in Venezuela without just
compensation. 176 The parties jointly submitted to the court a list of four
"initial issues" to be decided by the court, including whether, for pur-
poses of determining if a "taking in violation of international law" had
occurred, the Venezuelan subsidiary ("H&P-V") was a national of Vene-
zuela under international law. 177 The district court conducted a lengthy
analysis of national and international sources in order to determine H&P-
V's corporate nationality 178 and concluded that "the general practice in
international law has been to consider a corporation a national of the
country of its incorporation.' '179
In reaching this conclusion, the court looked to several sources, includ-
ing § 213 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which
states that, "[flor purposes of international law, a corporation has the na-
tionality of the state under the laws of which the corporation is organ-
ized. '180 The court rejected the Second Circuit's 1962 decision in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,'8' to "disregard[ ] the nationality of the
corporation where it was different from the nationality of most of the
corporation's shareholders," finding that "Sabbatino's proposition that a
corporation's state of incorporation can be ignored has never been fol-
lowed by any court in the United States.' 82 The court held that "[t]he
weight of authority therefore leads to the conclusion that H&P-V is con-
sidered a national of Venezuela under international law.' 8 3
D. NON-COMMERCIAL TORTS-§ 1605(A)(5)
The "noncommercial tort" or "tortious activity" exception of the FSIA
subjects a sovereign entity to jurisdiction in the United States for claims
based on actions
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for per-
sonal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while
acting within the scope of his office or employment. 184
175. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 971 F. Supp. 2d at 49.
176. Id. at 54-56.
177. Id. at 56.
178. Id. at 57-61.
179. Id. at 58.
180. Id. at 59-61 (quoting RESFATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATnONS LAW § 213
(1987)).
181. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
182. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 971 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
183. Id.
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
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The FSIA limits the noncommercial tort exception in two significant
ways. First, it excludes claims based on the "exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform" any "discretionary function."'185 Sec-
ond, the Act excludes claims stemming from alleged "malicious prosecu-
tion, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights. '186 Thus, the exception applies to "rela-
tively few situations."']87
In the latest of a series of decisions relating to the terrorist attacks of 9/
11, the Second Circuit in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001
held that the allegations against two particular defendants were insuffi-
cient to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the Act.' 88 Plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants, including both the Saudi Joint Relief Com-
mittee and the Saudi Red Crescent Society, waived immunity as instru-
mentalities of Saudi Arabia by providing financial support to al Qaeda
and thus participating in and supporting tortious activity.189 Defendants
raised several arguments in response, including that the plaintiffs' claim
failed because they did not allege that the entire tort occurred in the
United States.190
The Second Circuit agreed with the defendants' argument based on the
"entire tort" rule.19' This rule, first articulated by the Supreme Court in
1989,192 requires that "[flor th[e] exception to apply.., the 'entire tort'
must be committed in the United States. ' 193 Plaintiffs alleged that de-
fendants' support contributed to the harms committed in the United
States via the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.194 They further
argued that the attacks were the foreseeable outcome of such contribu-
tion and support.1 95 The Second Circuit emphasized, however, that the
plaintiffs failed to allege that the defendant agencies-or any of their em-
ployees or agents-directly participated in the terrorist attacks.196 The
court held that such allegations failed to comply with the entire tort rule
inasmuch as "all of the tortious conduct allegedly committed" by defend-
ants, including "providing funding and other aid to entities that purport-
edly supported al Qaeda," actually "took place completely outside the
185. Id. § 1605(a)(5)(A); Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48,
81 n.4 (D.D.C. 2013), affd, 782 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 3, 2015) (This exclusion
applies "regardless of whether the discretion is abused.").
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B).
187. In re Terrorist Attacks, 714 F.3d at 116 n.8 (noting that the legislative history of the
FSIA suggests that Congress's purpose in implementing the noncommercial tort
exception was to allow officials and employees of sovereigns to be held liable for
traffic accidents in the United States).
188. Id. at 109.
189. Id. at 111-12.
190. Id. at 112.
191. Id. at 117 n.11.
192. Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 441.
193. In re Terrorist Attacks, 714 F.3d at 115.
194. Id. at 116.
195. Id. at 117.
196. Id.
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United States.' 1 97 As a result, the court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the case.
Jerez v. Republic of Cuba involved an effort to enforce a default judg-
ment rendered in state court against the Republic of Cuba and various
members of its officers and agencies, for damages stemming from the
"physical and mental torture" plaintiff alleged he suffered while incarcer-
ated in Cuba in the 1970s.198 To overcome the entire tort rule, plaintiff
highlighted the "continuing nature of his injuries." 199 The district court
stressed the need for both the tortious act and the resultant injury to have
occurred in the United States, in order for the noncommercial torts ex-
ception to apply.2° ° It held that even if the injuries had occurred in the
United States, "the tortious acts which gave rise to these injuries un-
doubtedly occurred outside of the United States. ' 20 1 In response to
plaintiff's allegation that Cuban representatives in the United States
failed to inform him of his condition (thus constituting a tortious omis-
sion), the court held that he had failed to submit evidence as to "the
knowledge or duty of unnamed individuals. '20 2
E. ARBITRATION-§ 1605(A)(6)
The FSIA provides in Section 1605(a)(6):
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case... in which the action
is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign state
with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all
or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between the
parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contrac-
tual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by ar-
bitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award
made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate, if
(A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to take place in the
United States,
(B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or
other international agreement in force for the United States
calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards,
(C) the underlying claim, save for the agreement to arbitrate, could
have been brought in a United States court under this Section or
section 1607, or
(D) paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise applicable.20 3
197. Id. (emphasis in original).
198. 964 F. Supp. 2d 52, 54 (D.D.C. 2013), aff'd, 775 F.3d 419 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
199. Id. at 56.
200. Id. at 55-56.
201. Id. at 56.
202. Id. at 57.
203. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6).
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In 2013, U.S. courts addressed this exception in three cases and found it
to apply each time.204
In Blue Ridge Investments LLC v. Republic of Argentina,2 5 discussed
supra, the Second Circuit held that the district court had "correctly con-
cluded that Argentina waived its sovereign immunity pursuant to the ar-
bitral award exception. °20 6 The court explained:
To our knowledge, every court to consider whether awards issued
pursuant to the ICSID Convention fall within the arbitral award ex-
ception to the FSIA has concluded that they do. We agree. Indeed,
inasmuch as (1) the Award was issued pursuant to the ICSID Con-
vention, which is a treaty or other international agreement in force
for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)(B), and (2) the United States
and Argentina are both parties to the ICSID Convention,. . . Argen-
tina's agreement to submit its dispute to arbitration under the ICSID
Convention constituted a waiver of immunity from suit pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 16505(a)(6)(B). 207
The appeals court thus affirmed the district court's holding that Argen-
tina had waived its immunity under the FSIA when it agreed to submit
the dispute to arbitration.20 8
In Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, the plaintiffs commenced
arbitration against Ecuador pursuant to the U.S.-Ecuador Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty (BIT).209 Following the arbitration, the panel issued an
award against Ecuador and the plaintiffs asked the district court to con-
firm that award pursuant to the New York Convention.2 0 Ecuador con-
tested subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the FSIA while the
plaintiffs argued that the FSIA's arbitration exception applied. 211 The
district court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that (1) "the Award's own
language indicates it was rendered pursuant to the BIT, an agreement
that provides for arbitration"; (2) "the Award is clearly governed by the
New York Convention"; and (3) "the New York Convention 'is exactly
the sort of treaty Congress intended to include in the arbitration
exception.' "212
204. See Blue Ridge, 735 F.3d at 75-76; Belize Social Dev. Ltd. v. Gov't. of Belize, 5 F.
Supp. 3d 25, 29-30 (D.D.C. 2013) (mem.), aff'd 794 F.3d 99 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Chev-
ron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 949 F. Supp. 2d 57, 60 (D.D.C. 2013) (mem.),
affd 795 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
205. Blue Ridge, 735 F.3d at 83-84. See Part II.A.1 supra.
206. Blue Ridge, 735 F.3d at 85.
207. Id. (internal citations omitted).
208. Id. at 86.
209. Chevron Corp., 949 F. Supp. 2d at 60.
210. Id. at 60 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2015)); United Nations Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,21 U.S.T. 2517,
220 U.N.T.S. 3, available at treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsgno=XXII-I &chapter=22&lang=en).
211. Chevron Corp., 949 F. Supp. 2d at 61-62.
212. Id. at 62-63.
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The court then analyzed what it called a "novel" argument raised by
Ecuador in contesting the application of the "arbitration" exception. Ec-
uador argued "that it never consented to arbitrating the underlying dis-
pute" and that the district court had to "satisfy itself of the arbitrability of
the underlying dispute before finding subject-matter jurisdiction over
[the] enforcement proceeding. '213 The court rejected Ecuador's argu-
ment, reasoning that it "appear[ed] to be an attempt by Ecuador to get
two bites at the apple of the merits of its dispute with [the plaintiffs], by
seeking to have this Court separately determine the arbitrability of the
underlying dispute under both the FSIA and the New York Conven-
tion."'2 14 The court stated that the argument "runs counter to the clear
teaching of [the D.C.] Circuit on the purpose and role of the FSIA":
The FSIA is a jurisdictional statute that .'speak[s] to the power of
the court rather than to the rights and obligations of the parties.'
Likewise, '§ 1605(a)(6) does not affect the contractual right of the
parties to arbitration but only the tribunal that may hear a dispute
concerning enforcement of an arbitral award.' Inquiring into the
merits of the enforcement dispute-that is, the arbitrability of the un-
derlying claims-would involve an inquiry into the 'contractual rights
of the parties to arbitration' and would thus be beyond the reach of
the FSIA's cabined jurisdictional inquiry. 215
The court noted that its rejection of Ecuador's suggested merits review
was consistent with cases decided by several other federal courts.
21 6
In Belize Social Development Ltd. v. Government of Belize, the plain-
tiff asked the court to confirm and enforce an arbitration award the
London Court of International Arbitration ("LCIA") had entered
against Belize to resolve a dispute relating to a series of telecommunica-
tions contracts.2 1 7 Belize argued that it was immune from suit under the
FSIA and that none of the FSIA's exceptions applied. The court
disagreed:
The LCIA's award in this case is clearly governed by the New York
Convention because both England (where the arbitration took
place) and the United States are parties to the Convention. Belize's
status under the convention is irrelevant. Moreover, it is well settled
that an action to confirm an arbitration award under the New York
Convention falls squarely within the ambit of the § 1605(a)(6)(B) im-
munity exception. 2 18
Belize further argued that the "arbitration" exception should not apply
because the underlying arbitration agreements were void under Belize
law.21 9 The court again disagreed:
213. Id. at 63.
214. Id.
215. Id. (internal citations omitted).
216. Id. at 63-64.
217. 5 F. Supp. 3d 25, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2013).
218. Id. at 33 (internal citations omitted).
219. Id. at 33-34.
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[rejecting the] proposition that the Court must conduct [ ] an inde-
pendent, de novo determination of the arbitrability of a dispute to
satisfy the FSIA's arbitration exception. Indeed, the FSIA jurisdic-
tion inquiry is a 'cabined' one that focuses on the authority of the
court, not the contractual rights and obligations of the parties. And
regardless of whether I consider contract validity now, the question
will be addressed anyway-as it always is, though under a deferential
standard-when I turn to the Article V(I)(a) exception to the New
York Convention. 220
Thus, the court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the
dispute.22
1
F. STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM-§ 1605A
Courts continued to grapple with the nuances of the "terrorism excep-
tion" to sovereign immunity under the FSIA in 2013. This exception,
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, was enacted with the passage of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ("NDAA"). 222
The NDAA amended the FSIA's original "terrorism exception," previ-
ously codified at Section 1605(a)(7). That provision, enacted in 1996, did
not provide plaintiffs with a federal cause of action; rather, it simply
granted the court jurisdiction to decide certain claims. Nor did it permit
the award of punitive damages against state sponsors of terrorism, as
does the 2008 enactment. The 2008 provision, now codified at Section
1605A, provides for a more uniform approach to compensating victims of
state-sponsored terrorism, as well as providing a greater deterrent to
state-sponsored terrorism.
This exception applies only to foreign sovereigns that have been desig-
nated by the U.S. Department of State as "state sponsor[s] of terrorism,"
as well as the agencies and instrumentalities of those states.2 2 3 Sover-
eigns so designated lose their immunity from suit under Section 1605A if
they were designated as a state sponsor of terrorism either at the time of
the terrorist act, or subsequently, as a direct result of the act that is the
subject of the litigation.22 4
Not every foreign sovereign recognized by the U.S. Department of
State as a state sponsor of terrorism will be subject to suit for any claim
arising under the terrorism exception, however. A state sponsor of ter-
220. Id. at 34 (quoting Chevron Corp., 949 F. Supp. 2d at 63).
221. Id. at 33.
222. Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3 (2008).
223. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). In 2013, the State Department identified
only four state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. See U.S. Dep't
of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/cl4151.htm (last
visited Apr. 11, 2015) (identifying the U.S. State Department's current list of state
sponsors of terrorism).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). See also Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 964 F. Supp.
2d 52, 53 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
§ 1605A where the sovereign in question was not recognized as a state sponsor of
terrorism at the time of the event in dispute and "was not designated [as such] as a
result of [its] treatment of [the] plaintiff").
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rorism (and its officials and agents) must additionally be alleged to have
participated in an act in furtherance of a terrorist objective.225 Such acts
include an "act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage
taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an
act."'226 The FSIA further limits claims to those brought by plaintiffs who
are U.S. nationals, members of the U.S. armed forces, employees or
agents of the United States, or legal representatives of these individu-
als.227 A plaintiff meeting any one of these categories must then demon-
strate causation and damages in order to potentially hold a foreign
sovereign liable under the FSIA.
2 28
1. Implementing the Exception
Timelines. In 2013, courts continued to address the effect of Section
1605A on claims previously filed pursuant to Section 1605(a)(7). 229 The
NDAA guaranteed retroactive application of Section 1605A for particu-
lar prior actions. Actions filed under Section 1605(a)(7) that were ongo-
ing at the time of the NDAA's enactment could be treated, on plaintiff's
motion, "as if the action had originally been filed" pursuant to Section
1605A. 230 Moreover, for any action validly invoking Section 1605(a)(7)
and for sixty days post-judgment, parties could bring "any other action
arising out of the same act or incident" under Section 1605A.2 31
In Van Beneden v. Al-Sanusi, a victim of a 1985 terrorist attack at Vi-
enna's Schwechat Airport had filed a claim under Section 1605A against
Syria, Libya, and certain individuals and organizations. 232 The 1985 at-
tack coincided with a simultaneous attack on Rome's main airport. 2
33
The district court dismissed the claim as untimely.2 34 On appeal to the
D.C. Circuit, plaintiff argued that his Section 1605A claim was timely be-
cause the suit was related to a timely filed Section 1605(a)(7) action aris-
ing out of the Rome attack.235 The D.C. Circuit reversed.
The court noted the similarities between the two airport attacks, in-
cluding the orchestration of the attacks by the same group, coordinated
training efforts in the same Syrian-sponsored training camp, the use of
the same types of weapons during the attack, and the same strategy for
225. 28 U.S.C.§ 1605A(c).
226. Id. § 1605A(a)(1).
227. Id. § 1605A(c).
228. Id.
229. Van Beneden v. Al-Sanusi, 709 F.3d 1165, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("[E]ven as the
NDAA rang the knell for § 1605(a)(7) suits, it promised a slow burial.").
230. NDAA § 1083(c)(2).
231. Id. § 1083(c)(3).
232. Van Beneden, 709 F.3d at 1165-66.
233. Id. at 1166.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1166-67. The related action was Estate of Buonocore v. Great Socialist Peo-
ple's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Civ. No. 1:06-cv-00727 (D.D.C.) (filed Apr. 21,
2006), a section 1605(a)(7) suit "against many of the same defendants for their
alleged support of the Rome attack." Id. at 1167.
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accessing the airport terminals.2 36 Ultimately, the court found that
"[i]nterpreting the proximal connection between two acts of terrorism...
requires a number of conceptual judgments" necessitating examinations
beyond "the ordinary meanings of 'act' and 'incident"' and held that the
Vienna and Rome attacks "constitute[d] the same 'incident."' 237
Evidentiary Burden. In Spencer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, victims
and their surviving family members sought a default judgment pursuant
to Section 1605A against Iran based on evidence submitted in a prior case
arising out of the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Leba-
non.2 38 In support of their claim, plaintiffs "urge[d] the court to take
judicial notice of the evidence presented". 239 The court held that taking
judicial notice of such evidence would provide an insufficient basis upon
which to grant judgment in the plaintiffs' favor because the plaintiffs did
not demonstrate that they were present at the time of the attack and that
they had suffered "'personal injury or death caused by' this blast. '240
The plaintiffs further failed to demonstrate that they satisfied the "status"
requirements of the terrorism exception enumerated in Section
1605A(c).2 41 The court distinguished its previous decision in Fain v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran242 by noting that "plaintiffs [in Spencer] have at-
tempted to rely entirely upon the [prior] Peterson case."' 243 The court
found such reliance "inadequate. '2 44 The Spencer decision highlights the
need to provide courts with evidence particular to the plaintiffs in a given
case-evidence in addition to that from other, related actions.245
Plaintiffs seeking to invoke the terrorism exception due to torture and
extrajudicial killing (as opposed to "a targeted bombing" or a "deliberate
execution") face a unique evidentiary burden. 246 In Kim v. Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, plaintiffs were relatives of a South Korean
national (Reverend Kim) 247 who they alleged was abducted by agents of
North Korea, severely tortured, and ultimately murdered, while serving
236. Id. at 1167.
237. Id. at 1168. The court emphasized that the attacks invited "a single group of peo-
ple committing two simultaneous attacks planned as part of a coordinated assault
on an identifiable group of individuals at similar locations using weapons from the
same shipment." Id. at 1167.
238. 922 F. Supp. 2d 108, 109 (D.D.C. 2013).
239. Id.; see Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2003).
240. Spencer, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 109-10 (citing § 1605A(c)) (emphasis in original).
241. Id. at 110. These requirements allow plaintiffs to proceed upon a showing that the
plaintiff is a U.S. national, a member of the U.S. armed forces, an employee or
agent of the United States, or a legal representative of any of these individuals.
242. 856 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding defendants liable based on judicial
notice of the evidence submitted in Peterson and affidavit testimony of a plaintiff
establishing his physical presence at the site of and injuries stemming from the
bombing).
243. Spencer, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 110 (emphasis in original).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 950 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32 (D.D.C.
2013) (noting the high evidentiary standard "that the statutory definition of torture
imposes").
247. Id. at 41.
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as a missionary in China.248 The plaintiffs sought a default judgment
against North Korea-a designated state sponsor of terrorism within six
months prior to the filing of the action.249 The Kim court noted the high
evidentiary bar for pleading torture under the FSIA, emphasizing that
"[t]he FSIA adopts the definition of torture contained in section 3 of the
Torture Victims Protection Act."'250 Although the plaintiffs submitted a
wide range of evidence relating to Reverend Kim's abduction, from con-
gressional resolutions to a South Korean court decision,25 the court
found that such evidence failed to "establish the severity of the treatment
of Reverend Kim in particular, or that his treatment amounts to torture
under the rigorous definition of that term adopted in the FSIA. '252 Ac-
cordingly, the court refused to exercise jurisdiction.25 3 But the court of-
fered some hope for plaintiffs without access to direct evidence of torture
by certifying the action for interlocutory appeal.2 54 And, in 2014, the
D.C. Circuit found that the plaintiffs did present sufficient evidence to
establish that North Korea had tortured and killed plaintiffs' decedent
because of his political activities, as demonstrated by the decedent's well-
documented abduction and expert testimony on the conditions at the
camp where he was held.255
Claims by Foreign Nationals. Section 1605A does not provide a cause
of action solely for U.S. citizens.256 In fact, it expands the terrorism ex-
ception to U.S. nationals, members of the armed forces, U.S. Govern-
ment employees (even if not U.S. nationals), and legal representatives of
individuals in the first three categories. 257 Courts in 2013 continued to
recognize the ability of victims' non-citizen family members to avail
themselves of the jurisdictional benefits of Section 1605A. 258
248. Id. at 30, 32.
249. Id. at 30, 41. North Korea was designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1988 and
remained so designated until October 11, 2008. The action was filed on April 9,
2009. Id. at 41. Section 1605A(2)(A)(i)(I) provides that a court will hear a claim
against a foreign state pursuant to § 1605A if the state in question was designated
a state sponsor of terrorism "at the time the [alleged acts] occurred .... and ...
either remains so designated when the claim is filed under [the Section] or was so
designated within the 6-month period before the claim is filed[.]" (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(l)).
250. Kim, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1604A(h)(7)).
251. Id. at 35. Plaintiffs submitted evidence ranging from "congressional resolutions
relating to Reverend Kim's abduction, and press materials, book excerpts and re-
ports from human rights organizations and the U.S. State Department about North
Korea" as well as "the decision of a South Korean court that tried and convicted a
[North Korean] intelligence agent for crimes including the abduction of Reverend
Kim." Id.
252. Id. at 41-42. The court emphasized that the FSIA incorporates the definition of
torture contained in the Torture Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"). Id. at 32.
253. Id. at 42.
254. Id. at 43.
255. Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
256. 28 U.S.C § 1605A(c).
257. Id.
258. See Estate of Buonocore, 2013 WL 351546 at *20-21. See also Estate of Doe v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 943 F. Supp. 2d 180, 191 (D.D.C. 2013).
269
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The limitation of the federal cause of action to individuals falling within
the four categories set forth above has led some plaintiffs to advance
novel theories regarding the scope of the term "national." In Moham-
madi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, four former Iranian nationals alleged
they were "imprisoned, tortured, and/or killed in a Tehran prison. '259
The plaintiffs brought claims pursuant to Section 1605A against Iran.260
At the time of the alleged torture, however, the plaintiffs did not have,
and had not applied for, U.S. citizenship. 261 Nonetheless, they argued
that they should be considered U.S. "nationals" because, at the time of
the acts in question, they owed a "permanent allegiance to the United
States."262 The plaintiffs also directed the court's attention to previous
cases in which the D.C. Circuit had recognized allegiance to the United
States as a significant factor for determining jurisdiction under the
FSIA.263 The court distinguished the earlier case law because plaintiffs
had "not applied for or otherwise pursued U.S. citizenship at the time
that the defendants perpetrated the acts of torture and extrajudicial kill-
ing" alleged in the claim and noted that subsequent D.C. Circuit decisions
have "clarified" that "manifestations of 'permanent allegiance' do not, by
themselves, render a person a U.S. national. '264
2. Choice of Law Issues
In 2013, courts continued to confront difficult choice-of-law questions
in applying the terrorism exception. Indeed, the presence of non-citizen
plaintiffs, foreign law, and competing interests in combating terror have
led courts to confront difficult questions regarding the applicable rule of
law. In Estate of Buonocore, for example, the court considered claims by
family members of a U.S. national who was killed in an attack in Italy. 265
Applying the choice-of-law rules of the District of Columbia, the court
concluded that Italian law should govern the analysis.266 The court noted
that the victim's sons were not U.S. nationals at the time of the attack and
reasoned that although the United States "arguably has an interest in ap-
plying its domestic law to its aggrieved domiciliaries, that interest is di-
minished when those domiciliaries are not U.S. nationals." 267 The court
259. 947 F. Supp. 2d at 54.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 65.
262. Id. at 64.
263. See Asemani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 266 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2003)
(noting that the plaintiff had "demonstrated . . . permanent allegiance to the
United States sufficient to constitute him a 'national' within the meaning of FSIA"
where the plaintiff already had applied for U.S. citizenship); Peterson, 515 F. Supp.
2d at 25 (recognizing a decedent's allegiance to the United States pursuant to
§ 1605(a)(7) where the decedent was a member of the armed forces from 1980
until his death in 1983 while serving abroad).
264. Mohammadi, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (quoting Lin v. United States, 561 F.3d 502, 508
(D.C. Cir. 2009)).
265. Estate of Buonocore, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 14.
266. Id. at 14-16.
267. Id. at 16.
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further emphasized the lack of evidence that the attack in question was
specifically targeted against the United States and its citizens, as well as
Italy's interest in the matter. 268
3. Damages
In 2013, courts addressed the various types of damages available under
the FSIA terrorism exception, including economic damages, solatium,
pain and suffering, and punitive damages.
2 69
Economic Damages. Courts have awarded damages for reasonably
foreseeable economic loss under the terrorism exception. 270 These losses
reflect the decedent's expected earning capacity and any lost property.
271
As in previous years, courts in 2013 continued to rely on the testimony of
experts and the authority of Special Masters to determine damages.
272
In Estate of Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran, for instance, the court
reviewed the figures contained in an expert report that presented "each
deceased victim's expected stream of income." 2 73 Estate of Doe involved
a suit against Iran brought by the victims and family members of victims
of bomb attacks on the U.S. embassy and barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in
1983 and 1984.274 This embassy attack "was the first large-scale attack
against a United States embassy anywhere in the world, and it marked
the onset of decades of terrorism against the United States. '275 The court
approved the award of economic damages recommended by the magis-
trate judge, including the analyses and damages calculations contained in
the plaintiffs' underlying expert report.276 That report declined to factor
in payments received by the affected families from the U.S. government,
on the ground that the actual death benefits received were not "reliably
known. '277 The court agreed that such payments should not be included
in the damages calculation because (1) due to faded memories and the
absence of documentary evidence, the information on such benefits was
"extremely sporadic" and "no systematic inquiry about these benefits"
had been performed; (2) factoring such payments into a damages award
that accounted for contemporary values would be "quite complex" and
"substantively thorny"; and (3) "it is not at all clear that benefits paid by
268. Id. The court noted that Italy "has a strong governmental interest in... deterring
attacks within its sovereign borders .. " Id. at 15.
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)(4).
270. See Estate of Doe, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 180.
271. See id.
272. Section 1605A specifically provides for the use of Special Masters to determine
damages in cases falling within the terrorism exception. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605A(e)(1).
273. 943 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
274. Id. at 182-83.
275. Id. at 183 (citing Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 01-2224, 2005 WL
756090, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005)).
276. See Estate of Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C.
2011), and Report and Recommendation, Apr. 30, 2013, ECF No. 105.
277. Estate of Doe, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
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the U.S. government can be used to reduce Iran's responsibility. '278
Pain and Suffering. Damage awards for pain and suffering incurred as
a result of a qualifying act under Section 1605A vary according to the
degree and duration of the injury. Courts have noted that victims endur-
ing extreme pain and suffering "for a period of several hours or less"
have been almost "uniformly" awarded $1 million.279 Other courts have
referred to $5 million as a "baseline" award for pain and suffering due to
a terrorist attack. 280 Courts have departed upward from this baseline to
$7 million and down to $1.5 to $3 million, depending on the injury.28 1 In
Estate of Doe, the court made downward departures, for example, for
victims incurring "fairly light physical injuries," defined as "injuries that
required no medical attention. '2 82 In Buonocore, the court determined
that victims who "died instantly" would not be awarded damages for pain
and suffering.283
Solatium. While a number of courts in 2013 noted the availability of
solatium damages under Section 1605A, few courts engaged in an analysis
of such damages. Solatium damages compensate plaintiffs "for 'the
mental anguish, bereavement and grief that those with a close personal
relationship to a decedent experience as a result of the decedent's death,
as well as the harm caused by the loss of the decedent, society and com-
fort."' 284 Courts will generally look to previous case law to properly esti-
mate such awards.285 In Goldberg-Botvin, discussed supra, the court
noted a "general rule of this Court" that parents of a victim receive $5
million and siblings receive $2 million each.2 86
Punitive Damages. Unlike its predecessor, Section 1605(a)(7), Section
1605A allows plaintiffs to seek punitive damages against state sponsors of
terrorism. 287 Punitive awards serve a deterrence function, and, in this
category of damages, courts scrutinize less the award as to each individual
plaintiff and instead focus on a total award that will serve to deter and
punish the defendant state sponsor of terrorism. 288 In Estate of Doe, the
Magistrate Judge recommended that $600 million be awarded in punitive
damages in a case involving the bombing of the U.S. barracks and em-
bassy in Beirut.2 89 The court reduced that number to $300 million, taking
into account the amount sought by the plaintiffs as well as previous puni-
278. Id. at 186.
279. Estate of Buonocore, 2013 WL 351546 at *28 (citing Baker v. Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 775 F. Supp. 2d 48, 81 (D.D.C. 2011)).
280. Estate of Doe, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 188.
283. 2013 WL 351546, at *28.
284. Id. at *29 (citing Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22 (D.D.C.
2009)).
285. Id.
286. Goldberg-Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 938 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2013).
287. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(e)(1).
288. See, e.g., Goldberg-Botvin, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (citing Oveissi v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 55-56 (D.D.C. 2012)).
289. 943 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
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tive awards against the same defendant (Iran) for the same bombings. 29°
Indeed, several courts in 2013 looked to the awards granted in other,
similar cases in order to assess punitive damages. The Estate of Buo-
nocore court, for example, noted that a "punitive damage finding
must ... comport with the requirements of due process, and should be
commensurate with awards in other FSIA cases. '2 9 1 The court then com-
pared a particular punitive damages amount with that awarded in prior
cases dealing with other, more deadly attacks.292 In Goldberg-Botvin, the
court used a ratio of compensatory to punitive damages in an earlier ac-
tion stemming from the same event to calculate punitive damages. 293 The
court multiplied the combined compensatory damages by the ratio to cal-
culate a punitive damage award "to be divided evenly among all four
plaintiffs. "294
V. ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS AGAINST FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN
Even if a plaintiff can demonstrate that one of the exceptions to immu-
nity applies, convince a court to exercise jurisdiction, and even obtain a
judgment against a sovereign defendant, enforcing that judgment
presents additional challenges with which the courts continued to grapple
in 2013.
Section 1609 provides that the property of a foreign sovereign in the
United States "shall be immune from attachment arrest and execu-
tion. ' ' 295 In 2013, courts continued to interpret such enforcement immu-
nity broadly, upholding immunity with respect to remedies that are "the
functional equivalent of attachment, arrest, and execution. ' 296 Such rem-
edies include, e.g., restraining notices, turnover proceedings, injunctions
against sovereign property, or requirements to post prejudgment security
that "would create precisely the same result that would obtain if the for-
eign sovereign's assets were formally attached. '2 97 On the other hand,
courts have refused to extend immunity to requests for, e.g., post-judg-
ment discovery about the location of the country's assets in the United
States,2 98 or for injunctions to require a foreign state to comply with its
290. Id. at 190.
291. 2013 WL 351546 at *31.
292. Id. ("While this shooting incident was very tragic and serious, and lives were de-
stroyed by it, it would not be appropriate for this Court to award plaintiffs $8
million more than the families and victims of the Beirut bombing in Valore
received.").
293. 938 F. Supp. 2d at 11-12.
294. Id. at 12.
295. 28 U.S.C. § 1609; see also Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 709 F.3d 49, 52 (1st
Cir. 2013).
296. Thai Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co. v. Gov't of Lao People's Democratic Republic, No.
10 CIV. 5256 (KMW) (DCF), 2013 WL 1703873, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2013).
297. Id. (citing Stephens v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1229 (2d Cir.
1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
298. Thai Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co. v. Gov't of the Lao People's Democratic Republic,
924 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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existing contractual obligations.299
In analyzing whether immunity from attachment or execution applies
in a given case, the Second Circuit has employed a test that "looks to the
practical effect of the proposed remedy, not simply whether it is specifi-
cally listed in the FSIA. ' '3°° In Thai Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd. v.
Government of Lao People's Democratic Republic, 30 1 the plaintiffs, seek-
ing to enforce an arbitration award against the government of Laos,
moved ex parte for restraining notices and turnover fees from four inter-
national airlines.30 2 In rejecting the plaintiffs' request, the court reasoned
that these remedies were the functional equivalent of attachment because
they "involve[d] court-ordered seizure and control. ' 30 3 The court found
that allowing the plaintiffs to proceed simply by labeling their request as
a "turnover proceeding rather than as attachment of that property"
would "eviscerate the protections of the FSIA. '30 4
This is not to say that plaintiffs cannot enforce against sovereign assets
to satisfy a judgment. As with jurisdiction, there are several exceptions to
immunity from attachment and execution in the FSIA, including specifi-
cally for property "used for a commercial activity in the United States"
where additional statutory requirements are met. 30 5 The FSIA also pro-
vides for attachment of sovereign property where a "person has obtained
a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of ter-
rorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under
§ 1605A .... ",306 But before any court can authorize attachment or exe-
cution of assets, the party seeking relief must "provide specific evidence
that [the] FSIA abrogates immunity and permits attachment and execu-
tion upon each property in question. '30 7
299. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 727 F.3d 230, 240-41 (2d Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 13-990) (FSIA did not prohibit injunction re-
quiring Argentina to pay holders of defaulted FAA bonds if it makes payments to
other bond holders because the injunction "d[id] not attach, arrest, or execute
upon any property." Rather, Argentina was free to pay the "FAA debts with
whatever resources it likes.") (internal citation omitted).
300. Thai Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co., 2013 WL 1703873, at *4 (citing NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Arg., 699 F.3d 246, 262 (2d Cir. 2012).
301. Thai Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co., 924 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
302. Thai Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co., 2013 WL 1703873, at *1.
303. Id. at *4.
304. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
305. 28 U.S.C. §1610(a). Section 1610 also provides for exceptions to attachment im-
munity for property of agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state "engaged in
commercial activity in the United States." Id. §1610(b). However, even where the
threshold "commercial activity" standards are met, certain special types of prop-
erty will retain immunity from attachment and execution, including, e.g., property
"of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its own account" (unless
waived), and certain property that "is, or is intended to be, used in connection with
a military activity." Id. §1611(b)(1)-(2).
306. 28 U.S.C. §1610(a) note.
307. Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, No. 13-mc-80116 JSW, 2013 WL 3815660, at *5
(N.D. Cal., July 22, 2013).
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A. COMMERCIAL ACTivITY EXCEPTION
Section 1610(a) provides that a foreign state's property "shall not be
immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution" if the
property was used for commercial activity in the United States and the
property in question "was used for the commercial activity upon which
the claim is based. '30 8
In determining whether this exception to attachment immunity applies,
courts in 2013 continued to look at whether the actions the foreign state
performed with respect to the property were those in which "a private
party engages in trade and traffic or commerce. '30 9 Put another way, "if
the activity is one in which a private person could engage, [the foreign
sovereign] is not entitled to immunity. 3 10
In Thai Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., the plaintiffs sought restraining
notices and a turnover of "overflight" fees owed to Laos from four air-
lines in connection with their efforts to enforce a $56 million arbitration
award against the Laos government.3 11 The fees were authorized by a
Laos statute that permits a "charge on any operator of an aircraft that has
conducted a flight over" its sovereign territory.3 12 The court denied
plaintiffs' request because the fees did not reflect commercial activity by
Laos, but, instead, were equivalent to "other taxes sovereign states assess
against transportation companies.., which are immune from attachment
as sovereign activity. '313 Indeed, the court noted that several foreign
courts had recently held that overflight fees "may not be attached to sat-
isfy judgments because they represent a sovereign function. '31 4 Moreo-
ver, even if collection of the fees could be deemed a commercial function,
the court explained, the exception still would not apply because the fees
were not used for a commercial activity in the United States as required by
Section 1610(a). 315
B. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 1610(c)
"Before permitting enforcement of an FSIA judgment, a court must
ensure that all foreign entities involved receive notice of the exposure of
308. 28 U.S.C. §1610(a). Section 1610(a) also provides for additional circumstances in
which property in the United States used for commercial activity in the United
States will not be immune from attachment or execution, e.g., if the foreign state
has waived its immunity from attachment or execution, or if the execution relates
to a judgment establishing rights in property taken (or exchanged for property
taken) in violation of international law. Id. §1610(a)(1)-(7).
309. Thai Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co., 2013 WL 1703873, at *6 (citing NML Capital Ltd. v.
Republic of Arg., 680 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2012)).
310. Id. (citing LNC Invs., Inc. v. Republic of Nicar., No. 96 Civ. 6360 JFK., 2000 WL
745550, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000)).
311. Id. at *1.
312. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
313. Id. at *6.
314. Id. at *7.
315. Id.
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their property and other interests to attachment and execution. ' 316 Thus,
28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) provides that "[n]o attachment or execution [under
Section 1610(a) or (b)] shall be permitted until the court has ordered such
attachment and execution after having determined that a reasonable pe-
riod of time has elapsed following the entry of judgment and the giving of
any notice required under Section 1608(e).1 317
In Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho, S.A., the dis-
trict court clarified the requirements for providing notice to a foreign sov-
ereign under Section 1610(c).318 The plaintiffs sought to enforce a 2003
judgment in the Southern District of Mississippi against defendant
Corfino, a public corporation created by the Honduran Forest Ministry,
for various breach of contract and tort claims relating to plaintiffs' re-
moval as managers of a project to exploit lumber resources in Hondu-
ras. 319 Corfino then stopped defending the lawsuit, and the court entered
a judgment after a hearing on the merits. 320 In 2011, the plaintiffs regis-
tered the Mississippi judgment in the Southern District of New York.321
In January 2013, they applied for an order declaring that they had satis-
fied the FSIA's § 1610(c) notice provisions, and specifically "that a rea-
sonable period of time had elapsed after entry of the judgment against
Corfino in 2003 and that notice under Section 1608(e) was not required
because the judgment was not a default. '322 In addition, they sought a
judicial finding that the Republic of Honduras was the successor in inter-
est to Corfino. The district court issued the order, and Honduras filed a
motion to vacate.323
Reconsidering its prior ruling, the district court clarified that "[e]ven
where a foreign state or its instrumentality initially appears in an action,
judgment creditors must provide notice of a subsequent default judgment
in accordance with Section 1608(e). '32 4 This was necessary because,
when "a foreign state or agency is not participating or has withdrawn
from the litigation, the entry of a default judgment will not, in and of
itself, give sufficient warning that the defendant's interests and assets are
exposed. ' 325 The plaintiffs argued that, because the court entered judg-
ment following an evidentiary hearing, the "evidentiary findings trans-
316. Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Indus. de Olancho, S.A., 974 F. Supp. 2d 264, 273
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), affd sub nom. Byrd v. Republic of Honduras, 2015 WL 3448835
(2d Cir. June 1, 2015) (citing Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russ. Fed'n, 798 F. Supp.
2d 260, 267 (D.D.C. 2011)).
317. Section 1608(e) provides that "[n]o judgment by default shall be entered by a court
of the United States ... against a foreign state ... or an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by
evidence satisfactory to the court."
318. Byrd, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 272-273.
319. Id. at 266.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 265.
322. Id. at 267.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 273.
325. Id. (citing Agudas Chasidei Chabad, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 267).
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formed [the] default judgment into a final judgment immune from FSIA
notice requirements .... ",326 The court disagreed, explaining that Section
1610(c) "requires a court to find an evidentiary basis for the claims before
issuing a default judgment against a foreign state or its instrumental-
ity. ' '3 2 7 Accordingly, even though the defendant was not present, the
judgment remained a default judgment and the plaintiffs were required to
serve the judgment on Corfino and provide notice to Honduras in accor-
dance with Section 1608(e). 328 Because the plaintiffs had failed to com-
ply with the notice provisions, the court granted Honduras's motion to
vacate.
C. TERRORISM JUDGMENTS-ATTACHMENT AND EXECUTION
The FSIA contains separate rules for attachment and execution in
cases involving victims of state-sponsored terrorism.
1. Section 1610(g)
Section 1610(g) authorizes "attachment in aid of an execution of a
judgment entered under Section 1605A. ' ' 329 It provides that "property of
a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under Section 1605A,
and the property of an agency or instrumentality of such a state ... is
subject to attachment in aid of execution .. ,,330 The expansive reach of
Section 1610(g) is particularly useful because it permits judgment credi-
tors to attach "any U.S. property in which [the designated terrorist state]
has any interest. '331 Under this provision, "the only requirement for at-
tachment or execution of property is evidence that the property in ques-
tion is held by a foreign entity that is in fact an agency or instrumentality
of the foreign state against which the Court has entered judgment. '332
Section 1610(g) does not impose a "commercial use test." 333 Rather, it
permits "attachment regardless of where the profits go or whether the
government controls the property." 334
In 2013, several plaintiffs sought to enforce judgments under § 1610(g)
with varying degrees of success. For example, in Ministry of Defense and
Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic
Defense Systems, Inc., the court permitted certain claimants who held
judgments against Iran under Section 1605A to attach an arbitration




329. Estate of Heiser v. Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ, N.Y. Branch, 919 F. Supp. 2d
411, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
330. 28 U.S.C. 161 0(g)(1); Estate of Heiser, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
331. Estate of Heiser, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (citing Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 807 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2011)).
332. Id. (citing Estate of Heiser, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 19).
333. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g).
334. 984 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1094 (S.D. Cal. 2013).
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try.335 Section 1605A applied even though the activity at issue, the
purchase of military equipment was "a classic government function. ' 336
The court noted that, prior to the enactment of Section 1605A, "[a] signif-
icant roadblock exist[ed] because few Iranian assets remain in the United
States ... impair[ing] the ability of terrorism victims to obtain justice." 337
In recognition of this problem, Congress "sensibly expanded the universe
of assets that could be attached to any property interest in which the for-
eign state enjoys a beneficial ownership. '338 But claimants whose suits
were brought under the prior "terrorism exception" statute were not eli-
gible to invoke Section 1610(g), which "by its express terms, applies only
to 'judgments under 1605A"' and not its predecessor statute.339
2. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
A related statutory scheme permits victims of state-sponsored terror-
ism to execute on judgments against foreign sovereigns that sponsor ter-
rorism. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ("TRIA"), codified in
part as 28 U.S.C. §1610 note, allows plaintiffs to "execute [a judgment]
against blocked assets of a terrorist party" as well as the assets of an
"agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party. '340 The TRIA defines
a terrorist party as "a terrorist, a terrorist organization ... , or a foreign
state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979."341
One issue that arose in 2013 regarding attachment of terrorism judg-
ments is the interplay between the TRIA and the general immunity af-
forded central banks under §1611. In Levin v. Bank of New York
Mellon,342 the plaintiffs sought to attach certain funds a foreign central
bank had directed JPMorgan to transfer from the central bank's own ac-
count to an Iranian engineering firm. 343 The central bank opposed the
attachment, arguing that central bank immunity (§1611) preempted the
TRIA. 344 The court disagreed, finding that the TRIA's broad authoriza-
tion of attachment of blocked assets of terrorist parties, "notwithstanding
any other provision of law," preempts any statutory immunity from at-
tachment under the FSIA. 345 The court specifically found that, to the
335. Id. at 1096.
336. Id. at 1094.
337. Id. at 1095.
338. Id. at 1096 (citing H. Rep. No. 110-447 (Dec. 6, 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
339. Id.
340. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10 Civ. 4518 (KBF), 2013 WL 1155576, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2013), affd, 758 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2014), petition for cert.
docketed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. Dec. 31,2014) (No. 14-770); see generally Terror-
ism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
341. Peterson, 2013 WL 1155576, at *8 (citation omitted).
342. Levin v. Bank of N. Y. Mellon, No. 09 CV 5900 (RPP), 2013 WL 5312502, at *15
(S.D.N.Y Sept. 23, 2013).
343. Id. at *14.
344. Id. at *15.
345. Id.
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extent the TRIA and §1611 were in conflict, "any conflict should be re-
solved in favor of the TRIA because it was enacted after" the FSIA.3 46
The court cautioned that "providing an exception to attachment and exe-
cution for foreign central banks would frustrate the remedial purpose of
the TRIA," which is to "deal comprehensively with the problem of en-
forcement of judgments issued to victims of terrorism. '347 Allowing ab-
solute immunity for central banks thus "would leave judgment creditors
with valid judgments against state sponsors of terror without recourse if
assets happened to be held in the account of a foreign central bank. '348
Accordingly, the court held that central bank immunity did not preempt
TRIA, and the assets were not immune from attachment. 349
Another issue courts considered in 2013 is the scope of "blocked as-
sets" that terrorism victims may attach to secure a judgment against a
terrorist state. For instance, courts analyzed whether electronic fund
transfers ("EFTs") could be considered "blocked assets" of the sovereign
to whom the assets were being transferred. In Estate of Heiser, the court
found that EFFs belonging to several agencies that were "mere instru-
mentalities" of Iran were blocked assets that could be attached to pay a
judgment against Iran for its involvement in the 1996 bombing of the
Khobar Towers. 350 Likewise, in Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, the court
also held that EFTs located at JP Morgan Chase bank in New York were
blocked assets of the Banque Centrale de Syrie, an agency or instrumen-
tality of Syria. 35 1 Beyond EFTs, in 2013, one district court found that
bonds belonging to Bank Markazi, the central bank of Iran, were blocked
assets under the TRIA.352 But the First Circuit concluded that antiquities
from Iran were not "blocked assets" eligible for attachment and execu-
tion under the TRIA.353
A related issue is the meaning of the terms "asset of" and "property
of" a terrorist party. In Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the court
found that blocked assets in the possession of Visa owed to Bank Melli,
an Iranian instrumentality, could be considered the instrumentality's own
property or assets for purposes of the TRIA.354 The court held that it did
not matter that the bank did not actually "own" the assets yet. Under the
FSIA, enforcement of judgments is governed by the "law of the state in
which the Court sits."' 355 In California, where the case was brought, "all
property of a judgment debtor, regardless of the type of interest, is sub-
346. Id. (explaining that the TRIA's "notwithstanding clause--enacted in 2002, well
after FSIA § 1611(b) was adopted in 1976-thus preempts central bank immunity
to the extent it would apply").
347. Id. at *16 (citation omitted).
348. Levin, 2013 WL 5312502, at *16.
349. Id.
350. 919 F. Supp. 2d at 421.
351. No. 11 C 8715, 2013 WL 6009491, at *4 (N.D. I11. Nov. 13, 2013).
352. Peterson, 2013 WL 1155576, at *23.
353. Rubin, 709 F.3d at 55-58.
354. 927 F. Supp. 2d 833, 843 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
355. Id.
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ject to enforcement of a money judgment." 356 Because Bank Melli had a
"100% beneficial interest" in the assets, which were "already 'due and
owing' to Bank Melli from Visa," they could be considered "'assets of' or
'property of'" the bank.357
VI. PRACTICAL ISSUES IN FSIA LITIGATION
In 2013, judicial decisions regarding the FSIA explored various proce-
dural issues that arise in cases brought against foreign sovereigns, such as
the act of state doctrine, due process, service of process, jurisdictional
issues, venue, forum non conveniens, default judgments and interlocutory
appeals. A brief review of certain notable decisions follows.
A. AcT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The act of state doctrine precludes U.S. courts "from inquiring into the
validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power commit-
ted within its own territory. ' 358 It applies when "the relief sought or the
defense interposed would [require] a court in the United States to declare
invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own
territory. '359 Courts are not, however, required to give deference to
purely commercial acts.360 The foreign entity seeking to invoke the act of
state doctrine as an "affirmative defense" has the burden of establishing
its applicability. 36 1 Further, "the act of state doctrine goes to the merits,
and is not a jurisdictional defense." 36 2 The court must resolve jurisdic-
tional disputes prior to any ruling on the merits, including whether and
how the act of state doctrine applies. 363
In United States v. One Gulfstream G-V Jet Aircraft, the United States
brought a forfeiture action against a $38.5 million dollar jet purchased by
Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue ("Nguema"), Equatorial Guinea's
Minister of Forestry and Agriculture and the son of Equatorial Guinea's
356. Id.
357. Id. at 843-44 (internal citation omitted).
358. Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 185, 196 (D.D.C.
2013); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 672 F.3d 1066, 1073 (D.C. Cir.
2023), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1582 (2013) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964)).
359. Kaplan, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 196 (quoting W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl.
Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990)).
360. See Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 920 F. Supp. 2d 517, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), affid,
768 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2014), petition for cert. docketed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3729 (U.S. Mar.
5, 2015) (No.14-1074); Best Med. BeIg., 913 F. Supp. at 237 (E.D. Va. 2013).
361. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 971 F. Supp. 2d at 62; Konowaloff v. Metro.
Museum of Art, 702 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2837 (U.S.
Jun. 17, 2013); Victims of Hungarian Holocaust v. Hungarian State Rys., 798 F.
Supp. 2d 934, 939 (N.D.II1. 2011), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Fischer v. Mag-
yar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2015).
362. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 971 F. Supp. 2d at 62-63 (D.D.C. 2013) (cit-
ing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004) ("Unlike a claim of
sovereign immunity, which merely raises a jurisdictional defense, the act of state
doctrine provides foreign states with a substantive defense on the merits.")).
363. Id. at 63.
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: 2013
president. 364 The United States alleged that Nguema purchased the jet
with funds derived from extortion, misappropriation, theft, and embezzle-
ment.365 Nguema argued that the act of state doctrine barred the suit and
that the court should decline to "complicate foreign affairs by validating
or invalidating the actions of foreign sovereigns. '3 66 The United States
countered that the complaint did not "impugn any official acts," and
maintained that all "relevant acts were perpetrated for Nguema's per-
sonal benefit. ' 367 The court found that the claim was not barred by the
act of state doctrine because the applicability of this doctrine is "weak-
ened when the Executive Branch of the United States is the party that
brings suit."'368 The main policy rationale underlying the doctrine is the
Judicial Branch's reluctance to interfere in the Executive Branch's for-
eign affairs power. When the Executive itself brings suit, courts can act
without fear of hindering or embarrassing the Executive in the conduct of
foreign relations.3
69
In Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG,370 Iraq sued more than ninety multi-
national corporations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganization Act ("RICO") and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA"), alleging that the defendant corporations conspired with de-
posed President Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials to corrupt the
United Nations' Oil-for-Food Programme, a large-scale humanitarian re-
lief program managed by the United Nations from 1996 to 2003. 371 The
defendant corporations contended that the act of state doctrine barred
the court from considering Iraq's claims. 372 The court stated that the pur-
pose of invoking the act of state doctrine is to "restrain[ ] the judiciary
from interfering with the Executive Branch's conduct of foreign af-
fairs."'3 73 This policy was not implicated where the foreign government
itself had brought the claim in a U.S. court, "calling into question" the,
acts of the prior regime.
374
Nevertheless, the court clarified that Iraq could not avoid legal respon-
sibility for the conduct of that prior regime simply because the act of state
doctrine did not apply. The prior regime's acts remained government
conduct (not merely private, self-serving conduct) performed under color
of authority.3 75 As the court observed, sovereign states are accountable
364. United States v. One Gulfstream G-V Jet Aircraft, 941 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C.
2013).
365. Id. at 5.
366. Id. at 11(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. Although the court concluded that the United States' action was not barred by
the act of state doctrine, it nevertheless dismissed the case since the complaint did
not link the jet to any specific illicit acts.
370. 920 F. Supp. 2d at 517.
371. Id. at 524, 529.
372. Id. at 533.
373. Id.
374. ABB AG, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
375. Id. at 537.
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for the wrongful conduct of their governments and the "state's responsi-
bility for the acts of its government does not coincide with the application
of the act of state doctrine or the FSIA. ' '376 Indeed, the court dismissed
the case, in part because it found that Iraq's claims were barred by the
defense of in pari delicto because the alleged wrongdoing by the prior
regime was attributable to the state of Iraq.377
B. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Service of process pursuant to the FSIA must comport with 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1608(a) and (b), which set forth the acceptable methods of service on
foreign states or their political subdivisions, and their agencies or instru-
mentalities. Each provision provides a hierarchy of methods to effect ser-
vice, such that a plaintiff only may resort to subsequent methods of
service if it is unable to effect service under the prior methods. 378
While strict compliance with Section 1608(a) is required in an action
against a foreign state or political subdivision,379 only substantial compli-
ance with the service rules is required under Section 1608(b) in actions
against an agency or instrumentality of the state.380 Thus, for example,
some courts have allowed cases to proceed against an agency or instru-
mentality based on "'technically faulty service' [under Section 1608(b)] as
long as the defendants receive adequate notice of the suit and are not
prejudiced. '381
Where a plaintiff serves a complaint on a foreign state defendant under
the FSIA, the foreign state defaults, and then plaintiff files an amended
complaint, service of the new complaint is necessary only if the changes
are substantial. 382 In Shoham v. Islamic Republic of Iran, however, the
court directed plaintiff to serve a new complaint on six foreign defendants
again after her case was severed from a previously filed action brought by
victims of similar terrorist attacks and their families against Iran, Syria,
and other defendants under the FSIA's state-sponsored terrorism excep-
tion.383 The court noted that the new complaint was nearly identical to
the joint complaint, although it bore a different caption and excluded
facts and prayers for relief applicable to other plaintiffs. 384 The previ-
ously filed joint complaint had been successfully served on six defend-
ants.385 Nevertheless, the court concluded that service of the prior
376. Id. at 536, 540.
377. Id. at 543.
378. Byrd, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (internal citations omitted); see also Kaplan, 961 F.
Supp. 2d at 185.
379. See Jimenez v. United Mexican States, 978 F. Supp. 2d 720, 724 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
380. See Agudas Chasidei Chabad, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (citing Doe I v. State of Isr.,
400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 102 (D.D.C. 2005)).
381. Id. (citation omitted).
382. Shoham v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 922 F. Supp. 2d 44, 47 (D.D.C. 2013) (citations
omitted).
383. Id. at 44.
384. Id. at 46.
385. Id.
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complaint on six foreign state defendants could not be deemed to consti-
tute service on those defendants for purposes of plaintiff's subsequent
"new and unrelated" lawsuit, even if the claims were largely identical to
those made in the joint complaint.386
The plaintiff also moved for authorization of substitute service on three
defendants outside of their home country of Iran, after demonstrating
that service on these Iranian agencies or instrumentalities could not be
effected via special arrangement between the parties, or by serving an
agent in the United States.3 87 The plaintiff sought to serve these agencies
or instrumentalities through international registered mail, in countries
that were signatories to the Hague Service Convention. 388 The court
found that such service would be permissible as long as it was consistent
with Section 1608(b)(3)(C), which allows for service "if [it is] reasonably
calculated to give actual notice ... as directed by order of the court con-
sistent with the law of the place where service is to be made. ' 389 The
court thus permitted service on three defendants via the Clerk of the
Court using registered mail in seven countries that were signatories to the
Hague Service Convention and did not object to service via international
mail. 390 The court would not permit service to a defendant's address in
Australia-even though Australia was a signatory to the Hague Service
Convention-absent a showing that the relevant jurisdiction in Australia
permitted service by mail. 391
In Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc.,392 the plaintiff alleged that the People's
Republic of China and a Chinese Internet search engine service provider
conspired to prevent his pro-democracy political speech. He sought to
serve China under Section 1608(a)(3), "in accordance with an applicable
international convention. ' 393 China declined to effect service under the
Hague Convention, on the grounds that doing so would "infringe its sov-
ereignty or security" under Article 13 of the Convention. The plaintiff
argued that China's invocation of Article 13 was "illegal and erroneous,"
and that China's refusal to comply with the Hague Service Convention
did not defeat effective service because the defendants had actual notice
of the lawsuit.394 Plaintiffs also asserted that a default judgment could be
entered pursuant to Article 15 of the Hague Service Convention. 395
The court rejected these arguments. First, the court found that it
lacked jurisdiction to address the propriety of China's refusal to effect
service under the Hague Service Convention.396 Second, the court found
386. Id. at 47.
387. Id. at 49-50.
388. Shoham, 922 F. Supp. at 50.
389. Id. at 49.
390. Id. at 50.
391. Id.
392. 932 F. Supp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
393. Id. at 564 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
394. Id. at 565.
395. Id.
396. Id.
284 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 21
that actual notice was an insufficient replacement for service of process
under the Hague Service Convention.397 In so holding, the court noted
that the Convention does permit a state to refuse to comply with a re-
quest for service if the state determines that "compliance would infringe
its sovereignty or security. '398
C. DUE PROCESS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Historically, courts that have addressed the issue have held that, for
purposes of the FSIA, foreign states are not "persons" protected by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 3 99 Accordingly, foreign
states typically may not assert a lack of due process as a defense in FSIA
litigation. The consequence for a foreign state is that it is "not subject to
the minimum contacts analysis prior to the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion. ' ' 400 Thus, once subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA has been
established and defendants are properly served pursuant to the require-
ments of 28 U.S.C. §1608, the court will exercise personal jurisdiction
over the defendants.4 01
But the inapplicability of due process protection to foreign states under
the FSIA does not necessarily extend to foreign agencies or instrumental-
ities.40 2 A public foreign entity-e.g., a corporation owned and operated
by a foreign government-may be entitled to the same due process pro-
tections as a private foreign entity that is subject to personal jurisdiction
in U.S. courts, provided that it is run separately and independently from
the sovereign. 40 3 But due process protections may not apply even to such
entities where, e.g., the entity "is so extensively controlled by its owner
that a relationship of principal and agent is created," or where honoring
the distinction between instrumentality and sovereign "would work fraud
or injustice. ' 40 4 In Capital Trans International v. International Petroleum
Investment Co., discussed supra at Part II.A., the court concluded that
defendant International Petroleum Investment Company ("IPIC") was
not a "person" for purposes of the due process clause and therefore could
not invoke the minimum contacts test to avoid personal jurisdiction. The
court found that IPIC was clearly an agent of Abu Dhabi and could not
be treated as an "independent juridical entity. '40 5 IPIC's board of direc-
tors was appointed by Emiri Decree, and it was a "government-owned
397. Id. at 566.
398. Id. at 565.
399. Capital Trans Int'l., 2013 WL 557236, at *5; GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat'l Port Auth., 680
F.3d 805, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Arg. Republic, 893 F. Supp. 2d
747, 752 n.12 (E.D. Va. 2012) ("Every circuit court to address the issue has held
'that foreign states are not "persons" protected by the Fifth Amendment ... 
(citation omitted).
400. Cont'l Cas. Co., 893 F. Supp. 2d at 752 n.12 (citation omitted).
401. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b); Blue Ridge lnvs., LLC v. Republic of Arg., 902 F. Supp. 2d
367, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), afjd, 735 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013).
402. See Capital Trans Int'l, 2013 WL 557236, at *5.
403. GSS Grp. Ltd., 680 F.3d at 816.
404. Id. at 814 (internal citations omitted).
405. See Capital Trans Int'l, 2013 WL 557236, at *13.
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Plaintiffs seeking relief from foreign sovereign defendants often seek
jurisdictional discovery where further fact-finding may be necessary to
establish that the foreign entity falls within one of the exceptions to sov-
ereign immunity. Because "the FSIA's immunity provisions aim to pro-
tect foreign sovereigns from the burdens of litigation, including the cost
and aggravation of discovery[,]" courts often are disinclined to require
foreign sovereigns to participate in discovery.40 7 Accordingly, jurisdic-
tional discovery typically is permitted only when the plaintiff is able to
carry its initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that one or more
exceptions to immunity applies.
40 8
In Funnekotter v. Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe,40 9 the
plaintiffs were judgment creditors of the Republic of Zimbabwe, which
expropriated plaintiffs' property in contravention of a bilateral invest-
ment treaty between the Netherlands and Zimbabwe. 410 The plaintiffs'
judgment resulted from the court's confirmation of an arbitration award
in their favor from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID"). 4 11 After receiving this judgment, the plaintiffs
moved to amend the judgment to include as judgment debtors certain
additional defendants (e.g., Defendants Agricultural Development Bank
of Zimbabwe, Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe, etc.),
claiming that these defendants were "alter egos" of Zimbabwe.4 12 The
plaintiffs then sought to attach the defendants' assets in the United
States, arguing that the assets constituted property of Zimbabwe used for
commercial purposes against which Plaintiffs could execute their
judgment.4 13
Certain of the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and to halt ongoing discovery between the parties.414 They
argued that plaintiffs were not entitled to any discovery at all until they
established subject matter jurisdiction. 415 The court rejected this argu-
ment and found that the complaint alleged a sufficient factual basis to
warrant jurisdictional discovery.4 16 The court stated that, when jurisdic-
tional facts are disputed, the Court has "considerable latitude in devising
406. Id.
407. Lantheus Med. Imaging, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted).
408. Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
409. No. 13 Civ. 1917 (CM), 2013 WL 6091616 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2013).




414. Id. at *4.
415. Id.
416. Id.
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the procedures it will follow to ferret out the facts pertinent to jurisdic-
tion."'4 17 Further, the court noted that, when evidence on the jurisdic-
tional issues overlaps with evidence on the merits, the court had the
"discretion even to 'proceed to trial and make its jurisdictional ruling at
the close of the evidence." 418
E. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
Where a foreign sovereign does not answer or otherwise defend itself
against a complaint, a court may grant a default judgment in favor of the
plaintiff.419 Before a court will enter a default judgment, the plaintiff
must establish that there is sufficient evidence to support its right to re-
lief.420 The court may accept all uncontroverted evidence as true, which
may take the form of sworn affidavits or transcripts.42 1 The evidence
proffered, however, is subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence. 422 A
court may also take judicial notice of findings and conclusions in related
proceedings.42 3
F. VENUE AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Under 28 U.S.C. §1391(f), claims against a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof may be brought in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, "or any judicial district" where (1) "a substantial part
of the events... or a substantial part of property.., is situated"; (2) "the
vessel or cargo of a foreign state is situated"; or (3) "the agency or instru-
mentality is licensed to do business." Venue disputes in FSIA litigation
typically concern the location where "a substantial part of the events"
occurred.42 4
417. Id. at *2 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
418. Id. (citation omitted).
419. See, e.g., Sikhs for Justice, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 612; Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
845 F. Supp. 2d 204, 208 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding Iran liable for terrorist acts after
entry of default judgment where Iran failed to respond to Complaint).
420. Firebird Global Master Fund I, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 126; Spencer, 922 F. Supp. 2d at
109; Byrd, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e)).
421. Firebird Global Master Fund 11, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (citing Oveissi v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 49 (D.D.C. 2012)).
422. Kim, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 35.
423. Goldberg-Botvin, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 1 (finding that evidence presented in plain-
tiffs' previous case, and in another case arising from same bombing, established
that Iran was culpable for both the extrajudicial killing of plaintiffs' family member
and the provision of material support to the terrorist organization involved in the
bombing). See also Fain, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 115-16 (granting plaintiffs' motion for
default judgment against Iran after taking judicial notice of findings in related
proceedings).
424. See, e.g., Universal Trading & Inv. Co., Inc. v. Bureau for Representing Ukrainian
Interests in Int'l & Foreign Courts, 898 F. Supp. 2d 301, 317-18 (D. Mass. 2012),
affd, 727 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding that venue was proper in District of Mas-
sachusetts in a contractor's suit against agencies or instrumentalities of the Repub-
lic of Ukraine, where contractor's performance in Massachusetts was a significant
component of the contract claims and constituted an event giving rise to the
claims).
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But even where a proper basis may exist to bring an action under the
FSIA in a U.S. court, a defendant seriously inconvenienced by a particu-
lar venue may urge the court under the doctrine of forum non conveniens
to decline to hear the case in the plaintiff's chosen forum. Considering
whether to dismiss a case pursuant to the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens involves a two-step analysis.4 2 5 The first step in the forum non
conveniens analysis is determining the existence of an adequate alterna-
tive forum; the second requires determining whether a balancing of vari-
ous private and public interest factors strongly favors dismissal.
4 26 It
ultimately rests within the court's discretion whether to dismiss based on
forum non conveniens.
In Belize Social Development Limited v. Government of Belize, dis-
cussed supra, petitioner Belize Social Development Limited ("BSDL")
brought an action against the Government of Belize, seeking the confir-
mation and enforcement of an arbitral award pursuant to the Federal Ar-
bitration Act.427 The Government of Belize argued for dismissal based,
inter alia, on the relative inconvenience of litigating the matter in the
United States. Because the court found that BSDL had no adequate al-
ternative forum for a lawsuit seeking to confirm and enforce its arbitral
award, it denied the motion and allowed the case to proceed.
42 8
In Wye Oak Technology v. Republic of Iraq, the district court per-
formed a detailed analysis of the public and private factors favoring dis-
missal on the basis of forum non conveniens and upheld the "substantial
presumption" favoring the plaintiff's choice of forum.429 The case was a
breach of contract action brought by an American defense contractor,
Wye Oak Technology, against the Republic of Iraq.430 Iraq moved to
dismiss, contending that the Iraqi courts provided the proper forum.
431
The court first found that many private factors were either neutral or
weighed against dismissal. 432 Witnesses and documents were located
both in Iraq and the United States, resulting in unavoidable delay and
costs no matter where the litigation occurred.4 33 The costs and burdens
of translating documents similarly would apply to both parties. But the
FSIA would allow attachment of assets located in the United States that
weighed against dismissal.434
The court then analyzed the public factors weighing for and against
425. See Boeing Co. v. KB Yuzhnoye, No. CV 13-730 (ABC)(AJWX), 2013 WL
4446816, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2013) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 254 (1981)).
426. See id.
427. Belize Soc. Dev. Ltd., 5 F. Supp. 3d at 28.
428. Id. at 34.
429. Wye Oak Tech., Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 941 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2013).
430. Id. at 55.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 59-60.
434. Id.
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dismissal.4 35 The court concluded that Iraq's interest in resolving the na-
tional controversy at home evenly matched the United States' foreign
policy interest in the proper performance of defense contracts. 436 Sec-
ond, the court noted that it was fully competent to apply Iraqi law to
"numerous and complex issues."'4 37 Finally, the court found that only
very limited foreign discovery would be needed to recover documents
abroad. 438 Considering the public and private interests together, the
court sustained Wye Oak's choice of forum.439
G. INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
An issue that often arises in FSIA cases is whether a party may seek
interlocutory appeal of a court's ruling that immunity does or does not
exist under the FSIA, or that the United States presents an appropriate
forum for adjudicating the dispute. In 2013, courts addressed whether an
interlocutory appeal was warranted in the following contexts: a holding
that the plaintiff did not adequately allege FSIA's torture exception; an
order denying defendant's motion to dismiss under forum non con-
veniens; and a finding of a waiver of sovereign immunity where a plaintiff
sought to confirm an arbitral award against the defendant sovereign.
In Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the district court
agreed to certify for interlocutory appeal its decision regarding whether
the facts in the complaint adequately alleged a basis for invoking the
FSIA's exception for cases involving torture. 440 The brother and son of
an abducted South Korean national sued officials, employees, and agents
of North Korea under the terrorism exception of the FSIA, seeking dam-
ages due to the abduction. 44 1 When North Korea failed to answer the
complaint, the plaintiffs moved for a default judgment.442 The court
found that the plaintiffs' complaint had not provided sufficient evidence
to invoke the FSIA's torture exception and that the court thus lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 443
The court also held, however, that its decision should be immediately
appealable under. 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), which provides for certification for
interlocutory appeal when the "order involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ulti-
mate termination of the litigation."' 444 Under the statute, a controlling
question of law: (1) is one that would require reversal if it was decided
435. Wye Oak, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 60.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 61.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Kim, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 29.
441. Id. at 30.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 43.
444. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
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incorrectly, or (2) is one that includes dispositive issues that could termi-
nate the action, and thus materially affect the course of litigation and
result in savings to the court and the parties. 445 According to the court,
the determination of subject matter jurisdiction was a controlling ques-
tion of law.446 Further, the court also noted that whether the plaintiffs
had produced "the requisite quantum of evidence" presented "a substan-
tial ground for difference of opinion."'447 Third, the court noted that an
immediate appeal would "materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation."'448
In contrast, in DRFP, LLC v. Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, the
court refused to certify for interlocutory appeal its denial of the defen-
dant's forum non conveniens motion.449 In DRFP, a holder of promis-
sory notes sued Venezuela and the Venezuelan Ministry of Finance for
breach of contract and default on two notes that the holder had pur-
chased from a Panamanian corporation. 50 The court denied Venezuela's
forum non conveniens motion and Venezuela moved for certification of
the decision for interlocutory appeal.4 51 The court found that Venezuela
did not raise controlling questions of law-but was simply contesting the
court's application of established law in its fact-intensive forum non con-
veniens analysis.452 While federal courts may attach different weight to
various factors while performing a forum non conveniens analysis, result-
ing in different outcomes, this is not enough to establish a split in author-
ity.4 53 Finally, the court found that intermediate appeal would not
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, particularly because
Venezuela would find it an "uphill battle" to demonstrate that the court
abused its discretion by not dismissing the case. Thus, the court found
that the unsuccessful interlocutory appeal would delay the litigation.4 54
Finally, in Blue Ridge Investments, LLC v. Republic of Argentina,
where a purchaser and assignee of an arbitral award sought to confirm
the award against Argentina, the Second Circuit held that the district
court's interlocutory order refusing to dismiss the case was sufficiently
final for appellate review under the collateral order doctrine, to the ex-
tent it applied to Argentina's waiver of sovereign immunity.455 The court
explained that a denial of foreign sovereign immunity satisfies the condi-
tions necessary to invoke the collateral order doctrine, which "provides
for appellate jurisdiction over a small class of 'collateral' rulings that do
not terminate the litigation in the court below but are nonetheless suffi-
445. Kim, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 43.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 898-99.
448. Id. at 918.
449. Id. at 919.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. DRFP, LLC, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 919.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Blue Ridge, 735 F.3d at 72.
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ciently 'final' and distinct from the merits to be appealable without wait-
ing for a final judgment to be entered. ' 456 The court rejected petitioner's
argument that the collateral order doctrine should not be invoked where
the underlying proceeding involved only a confirmation of the award, and
did not subject the sovereign to a trial or other burdensome litigation. 457
Petitioner contended that the sovereign could easily and effectively ap-
peal the sovereignty issue after the entry of a final order.458 The Second
Circuit noted the "general rule that the denial of foreign sovereign immu-
nity is immediately appealable. '459 Although the court found it had juris-
diction over the question of whether Argentina had waived its sovereign
immunity under the collateral order doctrine, it declined to exercise pen-
dent appellate jurisdiction over the question of whether the assignee
could state a claim to confirm the award against Argentina. 460 This issue
stood independently from the question of whether Argentina had waived
its sovereign immunity, and did not warrant a discretionary exercise of
pendent appellate jurisdiction, which a court may exercise over related
rulings that would be otherwise unappealable but are "inextricably inter-
twined" with an issue over which the court properly has appellate
jurisdiction. 461





Id. at 83 (internal citations omitted).
